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I. INTRODUCTION 
From its very first publication in J. M. Keynes' General Theory 
of Employment. Interest, and Money, the liquidity-preference theory 
of interest has been the subject of a long, sometimes bitter, and 
always confusing controversy between itself and the loanable funds 
approach to the determination of the interest rate. While in many 
respects this controversy has waned from view today, and one might 
add not because it has been necessarily resolved, there still exist 
even now some skirmishes on or related to this topic among academic 
economists. For example, S. C. Tsiang has argued in a series of three 
recent papers (1956, 1966, and 1980) that while he accepts the generally 
held belief among economists (see Hicks 1936, Robertson under Ohlin, 
Robertson, and Hawtrey 1937, Lemer 1938, Fellner and Somers 1941, and 
Patinkin 1958) that if correctly specified, the liquidity-preference 
and loanable funds approaches to the determination of the interest 
rate really amount to the same thing, he adamantly disagrees with the 
traditional specification of the money demand function as depending 
on nominal income and the rate of interest. Instead, Tsiang argues 
that in order to make these two interest rate approaches truly 
compatible you must first respecify the money demand function as 
depending on ex-ante expenditures. As I will demonstrate later in 
my dissertation, after digesting Tsiang's arguments one is left 
not with the substitutability between the liquidity-preference and 
loanable funds theories of interest, but with the identity between 
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the money and loanable funds markets. And as we will see as we 
progress into the specifics of the liquidity-preference loanable 
funds debate, this error of confusing theories with markets is 
commonly made or hinted at by many of the other participants to 
this controversy. 
In addition to Tsiang's three papers, there exists a new work 
by the Keynesian scholar A. Leijonhufvud (1981) called Information 
and Coordination, where he suggests in his chapter seven, "The 
Wicksell Connection: Variations on a Theme," that one of the worst 
and misbegotten turns ever taken in macroeconomics was the adoption 
of Keynes' interest rate approach à la the General Theory over 
D. H. Robertson's loanable funds view. In fact, Leijonhufvud 
considers Keynes' liquidity approach to the determination of the 
interest rate to be a step backwards vis-à-vis the interest rate 
theory he advocated in his Treatise on Money, which included both 
stock and flow effects (that is, both old and new bonds) as the 
determinants of the interest rate. Ultimately what Leijonhufvud 
advocates is the reconstruction of macroeconomic models that combine 
Keynes' income-expenditure mechanism, which he considers to be the 
real contribution of the General Theory, with a Robertsonian type 
of loanable funds market. Unfortunately much of what Leijonhufvud 
argues for is marred by his interpretation of the liquidity-preference 
theory of interest as consisting of a given stock of money and a 
money demand function which is solely dependent on the rate of 
interest. This version of Keynes' interest rate theory is what 
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Hicks (1937) called his "special theory" of interest as opposed to 
Keynes' "General Theory" of interest, which includes the argument of 
nominal income in addition to the rate of Interest. While both of 
these versions of the liquidity-preference theoiry of interest may 
be found in the General Theory, it is this more complex version 
which has come down to us historically. 
But more on these two economists and others later on, where we 
will subject Tsiang's beliefs to a more detailed treatment since 
they follow in the natural historical line of the liquidity-
preference loanable funds discussion. Leijonhufvud's attack 
on the liquidity theory of interest will be given a more cursory 
treatment since it is motivated by an entirely different set of 
historical problems and issues. Let us now turn to the real purpose 
behind this dissertation. 
It is the primary goal of this work to distinguish among and 
solve some of the major issues which were raised in the interest 
rate controversy following the publication of the General Theory 
between liquidity-preference and loanable funds scholars. But 
before entering into some of the nitty details of the various 
combatants in this quarrel, let me begin by describing some of my 
motivations for choosing this as a dissertation topic and then 
attempt to relate it to the task set out at the beginning of this 
paragraph. 
There are certain aspects surrounding the standard presentation 
of the macroeconomy by way of ISLM types of models which have always 
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left me a bit puzzled and confused. Let us begin by looking at the 
almost exclusive use that is made of the money and product markets 
(often in conjunction with a labor market) by economists for 
pedagogical purposes. In the normal course of presenting the 
foundations of ISLM analysis some form of Walras' law either within 
a three or four market general equilibrium setting is usually first 
set out. Because the excess demands or supplies of these markets 
sum to zero—assuming an end-of-period model—it is then emphasized 
to the student how any one of these markets are otiose (i.e., func-
tionless) for the purpose of economic analysis. In the majority of 
cases it is the loanable funds (or bond or credit) market which is 
banished from view in the name of simplicity. Of course the student 
is then reassured that you could just have easily have eliminated the 
money or in fact any other single market without affecting the out­
come of any analysis which is to be performed later on. Now what I 
find so curious in all of this is, why do we almost always find the 
loanable funds market playing the role of the odd-man-out (for 
exceptions see Patinkin 1965 and Crouch)? Surely on the grounds of 
intelligibility alone you would expect to see more analysis conducted 
from the angle of the credit market than you find in actuality. To 
demonstrate my point, let me cite two common examples of economic 
analysis which I think would profit (at least from the perspective of 
the reader) by being studied from a loanable funds slant. 
Assume an economic environment which is end-of-period in nature 
and in which real output is demand determined. This would leave us 
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with a three market economy comprised of a product market, a money 
market, and a loanable funds market. By Walras' law any one of 
these markets may be eliminated for the purpose of economic analysis. 
I will begin with the case of the household sector in the 
economy experiencing an exogenously induced increase in its marginal 
propensity to save. Assuming that all economic variables do not 
adjust simultaneously, what series of economic events would you 
expect to see occur in a macroeconomic model comprised of a product 
market and a loanable funds or bond market? The increase in the 
marginal propensity to save among households would first lead to a 
situation of excess demand in the bond market and excess supply 
in the product market. This would then imply a fall in the rate 
of interest, correcting the existing imbalance in the credit market. 
The fall in the interest rate by reducing the opportunity costs of 
holding money balances would then lead to an excess demand in the 
money market. And finally, the contraction of real output brought 
about by the excess demand in the money market and excess supply in 
the product market would bring into equilibrium these two markets. 
Now let us take the same case and run it through a model 
comprised of a product market and a money market. The increase in 
the marginal propensity to save among households would first lead 
to a situation of excess supply in the product market and excess 
demand in the loanable funds market. The excess supply in the 
product market would first cause real output to decline. The 
decline in real output would then lead to an excess supply in the 
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money market. And finally, the drop in the rate of interest brought 
about by the excess supply in the money market and excess demand in 
the bond market would bring into equilibrium these two markets. 
Now it strikes me that this second scenario of what takes 
place in the economy following an increase in the desire to save 
among households (that is, savings + -> output 4- interest rate +) 
has historically muddled the distinction between savings as 
unconsumed product (that is, the slice of the real pie made avail­
able for investment) and savings as an available supply of liquid 
finance or credit. No wonder the student and sometimes even the 
instructor is left wondering concerning the whereabouts of this 
attempted increment in household savings which affects real output 
before changing the height of the interest rate. Does this imply 
that the economy's financial institutions are in such poor condition 
that any attempt on the part of households to increase their 
marginal savings rate comes to naught initially? Is this what is 
meant when textbooks refer to savings as a leakage out of the 
circular flow of income? Even if you could fight your way out of 
this tangle to develop a coherent set of responses to some of the 
issues that have been raised, it all seems to beg the question, why 
bother when we are in possession of a market (that is, the loanable 
funds market) which if properly nurtured can make all of this 
analysis easily understandable and intuitively compatible with the 
existing beliefs of most students of economics — especially the 
notion that a rise in the rate of savings should impact directly 
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en the interest rate — without affecting the ultimate outcome of 
our analysis, at least if one so desires? 
A second example of an economic exercise which I think would 
benefit by being studied from a loanable funds view is the case of 
a rise in the level of governmental expenditures unmatched by any 
increase in tax receipts or money supply (that is, an increase in 
the supply of government bonds). 
This time I will begin with the model consisting of a product 
market and a money market. All assumptions as previously stated 
are assumed to hold. What would you expect to occur in this sort of 
economic environment following a rise in the level of governmental 
expenditures unmatched by a tax increase or an increment in the 
supply of money? First there would occur an excess demand in the 
product market accompanied by an excess supply in the bond market. 
The excess demand in the product market would first cause real 
output to rise. This increase in real output would then lead to a 
situation of excess demand in the money market. The excess demand 
in the money market along with the excess supply in the bond market 
would then cause the rate of interest to rise, clearing both of 
these markets. 
Now, as I have done once before, let us route this new scenario 
through our alternative model consisting of a product market and a 
loanable funds market. Again all modeling assumptions hold. What 
would we expect to occur? The increase in governmental expenditures 
would imply an excess demand in the product market and an excess 
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supply in the bond market. Given the implied dynamics associated 
with this model, the rate of interest would first rise. This increase 
in the rate of interest by increasing the opportunity of holding 
money balances would then lead to a situation of excess supply in the 
money market. And finally, the excess supply in the money market in 
union with the excess demand in the product market would then cause 
real output to expand, eliminating the imbalances in both of these 
markets. 
From a logical point of view the problem with the first-
mentioned case is, how could the government incur and spend its 
incremental deficit without first going to the loanable funds well 
for its nourishment? In other words, it does not seem to make sense 
for government expenditures to rise along with real output before 
the rate of interest increases! How is one to explain this to a 
first year student in economics? In fact, how is one to explain 
this sort of reasoning at all? 
But even more startling than the failure to utilize the loanable 
funds market on the part of economists for pedagogical purposes is 
the partial use it receives at the hands of some authors of inter­
mediate money and banking textbooks. There we find the use of the 
credit market in the early phase of the text when the author is 
trying to relate to the student the partial equilibrium determinants 
of the interest rate, only to have a switch pulled on the reader when 
the serious business of macroeconomic analysis is to begin at the 
end of the book. Then we find ourselves back in the world of models 
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comprised of the product market and the money market; and again, 
we see the loanable funds market pushed to the side with very little 
explanation given. Why is this so? Doesn't it make more sense to 
maintain the overall coherence of the text and construct macro-
economic models that take explicit account of the loanable funds 
market? 
To some extent the non- and partial use made of the loanable 
funds market by economists in their analysis may be ascribed to 
historical circumstances and imperfect knowledge. It seems reasonable 
to suggest at this point that the part of economic history relevant 
for understanding the non-use made of the loanable funds apparatus in 
macroeconomic modeling may be connected with the perceived outcome 
of the liquidity-preference loanable funds interest rate controversy. 
It might be believed by economists that Keynes and other liquidity-
preference scholars bested D. H. Robertson and those of his ilk 
under the loanable funds, banner. If these two interest rate schools 
fought to a draw, it does not matter whether you exclude the bond 
market from your analysis. Since the economics profession has 
adopted enmasse Keynes of the General Theory, why not also utilize 
the liquidity approach to the determination of the interest rate? 
I hope to show later on why this line of reasoning is hopelessly 
confused; but more on this after we have inspected some of the 
arguments put forth by the various discussants to this controversy. 
The problem of Imperfect knowledge is somewhat easier to deal with 
and is, I believe, related to the partial or incomplete use that is 
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made of the loanable funds apparatus in intermediate money and 
banking texts. This being the case, it will be an indirect goal of 
this dissertation to familiarize the reader with the crude outlines 
of a loanable funds type of macroeconomic model assuming an end-of-
period framework. 
Before letting go of the question dealing with the non- or 
partial use made of the loanable funds paradigm among economists, 
it is worth noting one additional curiosity which has been lurking 
in the background of everything that has been said so far. We began 
this whole exercise by implicitly assuming through Walras' law that 
the loanable funds and money markets were substitutable. Otherwise 
it would have made no sense in comparing the pedagogical worth of 
the model composed of the product market and the money market with 
the model composed of the product market and the loanable funds in 
the manner it was done. Now the question that arises is this: if 
in fact these alternative models are substitutable as Walras' law 
implies, what accounts for the differences in the implied sequence 
of events associated with these two models following some economic 
shock? Is Walras' law wrong? Are my stories incorrect? Are the 
loanable funds and money markets really substitutable? 
Let us now switch tracks and focus on an entirely different 
set of issues and concerns. As suggested earlier, many economists 
believe and have attempted to prove the equivalency between the 
loanable funds and liquidity-preference theories of interest. Note 
the distinction between this issue and what has been discussed 
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previously. We are now talking about the substitutability between 
interest rate theories and not economic markets. Now a riddle 
arises when you attempt to perform economic analysis from the 
perspective of these two interest rate approaches. Assume again 
that an exogenous increase in the marginal propensity to save takes 
place among households. From a loanable funds theory of interest 
view the first thing you would expect to occur would be a lowering 
in the rate of interest. But now comes the surprise. Even in the 
face of unemployment it is possible that this reduction in the rate 
of interest might in fact lead to an increase in real income. This 
result would depend on how the aggregate money demand function is 
specified - in particular, the arguments that make up the idle 
balance function. What would occur in a model that utilized the 
liquidity-preference theory of interest? As suggested earlier, 
the first thing that would occur following a rise in the marginal 
propensity to save would be a decline in nominal and real income 
followed by a reduction in the rate of interest. 
Thus the question arises, what accounts for the differences 
between these two interest rate approaches? In this case not only 
are we dealing with a different sequence of events but a totally 
different potential outcome. Then in what sense can these two 
interest rate approaches be considered equivalent? Are the past 
proofs dealing with the substitutability between the liquidity and 
loanable funds theories of interest wrong? Are my descriptions of 
the economic events surrounding these two approaches misguided? 
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Along similar lines let me cite one additional example. 
Assume that the level of taxes rises in the economy. From a 
liquidity interest view what would you expect to occur? The rise in 
the level of taxes by reducing the level of disposable income avail­
able to the household sector and acting through the product multiplier 
would first cause real income to fall in the economy. The fall in 
real income then acting through the money demand function would then 
lead to a drop in the rate of interest. How might these events be 
modified when viewed from a loanable funds perspective? First, the 
rise in the level of taxation by reducing real consumption causes 
the rate of interest to fall. The decline in consumption along 
with the drop in the interest rate then acting through the money 
demand function will affect real income. As I will demonstrate 
later, it is quite possible, again depending on how the money demand 
function is specified, that real income might in fact rise following 
an increase in the level of taxation. 
So again we are faced with the problem of explaining the 
differences in the implied or possible outcomes associated with 
these two different Interest rate approaches following a change 
in some exogenous variable. 
Let me finish my comments concerning the relationship between 
ISLM models and the loanable funds market and the loanable funds 
theory of interest by looking at the model's behavior when out of 
equilibrium. 
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It always struck me as an odd feature of ISLM models that 
they leave with you the impression that the first order difference 
equation of the interest rate is intimately linked with both the 
money and loanable funds markets. This is liable to lead to all 
sorts of mischief. For example, assume a disequilibrium situation 
in which there exists an excess supply in both the money and bond 
markets together with an excess demand in the product market: 
How would the economy adjust to the new equilibrium position? The 
excess supply in the money market would imply a fall in the rate 
of interest, whereas the excess supply in the bond market would 
imply a fall in the price of bonds or a rise in the rate of 
interest. How could this be? Which is correct? Assuming that 
you choose either the money or bond market as the primary two-
dimensional determinant of the rate of interest, what role would 
the other market play? 
Before relating what I have said to the loanable funds 
liquidity-preference interest rate debate, let me condense my 
observations into a set of five questions which will act as a 
guide for the rest of this dissertation: 
1. Under static general equilibrium conditions, is the loan­
able funds market substitutable with the money market assuming end-
of-period analysis? 
2. Under dynamic conditions, is the loanable funds market 
substitutable with the money market assuming end-of-period analysis? 
And furthermore, what is the relationship between this analysis 
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and the liquidity-preference loanable funds interest rate 
controversy? 
3. Under static general equilibrium conditions, is the 
loanable funds theory of interest equivalent to the liquidity-
preference theory of interest assuming end-of-period analysis? 
4. What is the relationship between the loanable funds 
market, the money market, the loanable funds theory of interest, 
and the liquidity-preference theory of interest assuming end-of-
period analysis? 
5. What accounts for the limited use that has been made of 
the loanable funds market in modem macroeconomic analysis? 
Assuming period analysis, does the non-use of the loanable funds 
market make sense from a pedagogical view? 
Of these five questions, question five will be given the least 
emphasis. In addition to trying to answer the above questions, as 
mentioned earlier, I will also be concerned with familiarizing 
the reader of this dissertation with the crude outlines of the 
loanable funds approach. 
But how does any of this relate to the loanable funds 
liquidity-preference interest rate debate? Simply this: Almost 
every issue I have raised so far has been part of the composition 
of this interest rate controversy. 
It is my intention to use this interest rate discussion as 
a vehicle in answering the five questions that have so far been 
raised. No attempt at historical completeness will be sought 
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Instead, I will pick and choose from those scholars who have 
contributed to this discussion the ones I think might bear fruit. 
Now let us turn to the actual controversy itself. 
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II. THE LIQUIDITY-PREFERENCE LOANABLE FUNDS 
INTEREST RATE CONTROVERSY - A SELECT REVIEW 
A. Introduction 
The ideas of J. M. Keynes, J. R. Hicks, B. Ohlin, D. H. Robertson, 
D. Patinkin, and S. C. Tsiang will be presented in this chapter as 
they relate to the liquidity-preference loanable funds interest rate 
controversy. Quite naturally, I will begin with Keynes' presentation 
of the liquidity-preference theory of interest and his attacks against 
classical interest rate theory as it appears in the Général Theory. 
The other economic scholars mentioned will appear in approximately 
historical order. 
B. J. M. Keynes' Liquidity-Preference 
Theory of Interest 
1. Keynes' critique of the classical theory of interest (1964, 
££. 175-185) 
a. The classical theory of interest as stated by Keynes in 
the General Theory For Keynes, the classical theory of interest 
is simply the proposition that the rate of interest will adjust in 
such an automatic way so as to bring into balance the supply and 
demand schedules for investable resources, where the demand curve 
may be thought of as a marginal efficiency of capital schedule 
which is solely a function of the rate of interest, and the supply 
curve is a savings schedule which is a function of the rate of 
interest and income, where income is considered a constant. These 
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schedules may also be thought of as demand and supply schedules 
of loanable funds. 
From this view of the classical theory of interest, the 
following two important implications follow: one, if the marginal 
propensity to save on the part of society increases, then the rate 
of interest will fall and the quantity of investment will rise, and 
if the marginal propensity to save on the part of society declines, 
then the rate of interest will rise and the quantity of investment 
will fall; and, two, if the marginal efficiency of capital increases, 
the rate of interest will rise, and so will the quantity of savings. 
If the marginal efficiency of capital declines, the rate of interest 
will fall and so will the quantity of savings forthcoming. 
In conclusion, we might say that the factors of thrift and 
productivity have an intimate link in determining the height of 
the interest rate within the classical model of the interest rate 
as described by Keynes in his General Theory, 
b. Keynes * criticism of the classical approach to the determi­
nation of the interest rate Quite surprisingly, Keynes has no 
problem in accepting the previously described classical theory of 
interest as long as one begins by assuming that the level of income 
is considered a given. Where Keynes begins to part roads with the 
classical paradigm is when it attempts to perform some comparative-
static types of exercises. For example, it was stated earlier how 
a rise in the marginal efficiency of capital will cause the rate of 
interest to move upward which will induce an increase in the quantity 
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of savings offered in the market or how an increase in the marginal 
propensity to save will induce a fall in the rate of interest and a 
rise in the quantity of investment. Keynes considers all of this 
to be pure "nonsense theory". 
He argues that any shift in these schedules implies a change 
in the level of income which the classical theory of interest is 
incapable of embodying in its analysis. Since the classical theory 
of the interest rate leaves out this income effect, we cannot depend 
on its implications in terms of where the rate of interest might end 
up, or what the new level of savings and investment might be 
following some exogenous shock to the system. 
c. Some secondary criticisms raised by Keynes against the 
classical theory of interest Keynes also suggests three 
additional arguments to the ones already mentioned against the 
classical theory of interest; first, since it is uncertain that the 
savings supply schedule has a positiva slope, and we know that the 
demand schedule for investible resources has a negative slope, it 
is quite possible that these two schedules may never intersect at 
a positive interest rate; secondly, while it is common for economists 
to believe that changes in the supply of money affect the rate of 
interest, the classical presentation of the interest rate offers us 
no mechanism by which changes in the quantity of money may affect 
the savings or Investment schedules, thus eliminating the possibility 
within the classical framework of money affecting the rate of 
interest; and, thirdly, to derive the demand schedule for loanable 
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funds, one must already know something about the current level of 
investment, but to know something about the current level of invest­
ment you must already have to know something about the rate of 
interest, and thus there exists circular reasoning in using the demand 
schedule as a force in the determination of the interest rate. 
d. Some conclusions concerning Keynes' critique of the 
classical theory of interest We may summarize Keynes' major 
criticisms of the classical approach to the determination of the 
interest rate by saying that he believed it to be incomplete in the 
sense of ignoring income effects and changes in the quantity of 
money, besides being circular in reasoning and possibly dysfunctional 
in the sense of the supply of savings and demand for investment 
schedules not intersecting at a positive rate of interest. 
2. Keynes' liquidity-preference theory of interest (1964, pp. 165-
175. 194-209) 
a. Mlcrofoundations Each economic agent in the economy is 
presumed to make two sets of decisions in order to fulfil their 
psychological time-preference profiles. Decision one involves the 
choice of how to divide their income between present and future 
consumption. Decision two involves determining in what form of 
wealth the individual will carry his postponed consumption: money 
or bonds. The desire to hold wealth in the form of money is known 
as liquidity-preference. Three factors motivate liquidity-preference: 
the transactions demand for money, the precautionary demand for money, 
and the speculative demand for money. It is assumed that the 
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speculative demand for money is most sensitive to the rate of 
interest, while the transactions and precautionary demand for money 
are most strongly related to the level of nominal income and the 
general level of economic activity. 
b. Keynes' "special theory" of interest (besides Keynes, see 
Hicks 1937) For each individual and for the economy as a whole, 
the speculative demand for money implies a smooth and negatively 
sloped schedule between the rate of interest and the quantity 
demanded of speculative money balances. This is because every drop 
in the rate of interest causes some "bull", that is an investor who 
thinks interest rates will fall in the future, to become "bearish", 
that is an investor who believes that interest rates will rise in 
the future. This switch from the "bull" to the "bearish" position 
leads to an increase in the quantity demanded of speculative 
balances. 
If we subtract from the total money supply the demand to hold 
money for transactions and precautionary reasons, then we can say 
that the rate of interest adjusts so that society is just willing 
to hold this speculative or hoarded stock of money. That is, in 
final equilibrium the demand schedule for speculative or hoarded 
stocks of money just equals the existing supply. 
1) Two implications of Keynes' "special theory" of 
interest First, the rate of interest is a reward for not hoarding 
(that is, not holding speculative balances) as opposed to not 
spending. According to Keynes, classical interest rate theory makes 
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the mistake of focusing upon the first psychological time-preference 
decision of how much to spend now and how much to defer or save for a 
later period, whereas Keynes' "special theory" emphasizes the second 
time-preference decision concerning what form to hold these savings 
in - money or bonds. It is Keynes' belief that it is this second 
decision which is critical in determining the rate of interest. 
Secondly, the height of the interest rate has little if anything 
to do with savings (as stated above, it is the second time-preference 
decision that is relevant in determining the rate of interest) or 
the marginal efficiency of capital curve. The interest rate is 
simply a product of the supply and demand for speculative or hoarded 
balances. Thus Keynes' "special theory" version of the liquidity-
preference theory of interest has eliminated the forces of thrift 
and productivity from playing a role in the determination of the 
interest rate. 
c. Keynes * "General Theory" of interest (besides Keynes, see 
Hicks 1937) The "General Theory" version of the liquidity-
preference theory of interest widens the scope of phenomena that 
might influence the level of the interest rate. Mathematically, 
the "special theory" of interest can be represented by M^ =L(r^ ), 
where M represents the available supply of speculative balances, 
L(r^ ) is the speculative demand for money, and r^  is the rate of 
interest. In the "General Theory" version of the liquidity-preference 
theory of interest, we have Where stands for 
the total money stock, L(r^ ) again represents the speculative demand 
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for money, r^  the rate of interest, L(Y^ ) the precautionary and 
transactions demand for money, and nominal income. Ifhile not 
explicitly included, nominal income is also functionally related 
to the rate of interest. It is this version of Keynes' theory of 
interest which has come down to us today relatively unscathed. 
1) ^  important Implication of Keynes' "General Theory" 
of interest Within Keynes' "General Theory" of interest, the 
rate of interest is no longer just a reward for not hoarding. By 
allowing for the effects of nominal income on the rate of interest, 
Keynes has reintroduced the classical margin of time back in as a 
determinant of the interest rate. While I believe it is still 
correct to think of the speculative demand for money as the primary 
explanation of the rate of interest, at least with the presence 
of nominal income in Keynes' money demand function the forces of 
thrift and productivity are reintroduced as partial determinants of 
the interest rate. 
C. Some Macroeconomic Models Utilizing the 
Liquidity-Preference Approach to the 
Determination of the Interest Rate 
1. A macroeconomic model assuming the "special theory" of interest 
While Keynes rejects the supply and demand approach for 
investible resources as the primary explanation for the rate of 
interest, he still finds a constructive use for this apparatus. 
Let me quote from Keynes what I think he has in mind in terms of 
how these schedules might be used when viewing the "forest" as 
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opposed to the "trees" of the economic landscape: 
"Moreover, this proposition—that is, that the 
demand and supply for investible resources deter­
mines the rate of interest given the level of 
income—would lead naturally to another prop­
osition which embodies an important truth; 
namely, that, if the rate of interest is given 
as well as the demand curve for capital and 
the influence of the rate of interest on the 
readiness to save out of given levels of income, 
the level of income must be the factor which 
brings the amount saved to equality with the 
amount invested." (Keynes 1964, pp. 178-179) 
This quote implies a macroeconomic model comprised of Keynes' "special 
theory" of interest and the savings investment schedules of the 
classical theory of interest. (See Keynes 1964, pp. 245-247, 181, 
and Hicks 1937.) More exactly, we have 
M.=L(r.), L <0, (II. 1) 
 ^  ^ t^ 
S^ =s(y^ ,r^ ), Sy >0, s^  >0, (II.2) 
I =i(r ), i <0, (II.3) 
z z 
and S =I . (II.4) 
t t 
Where is the economy's given stock of speculative balances, L(r^ ) 
is the speculative demand for money, r^  the rate of interest, s(y^ ,r^ ) 
the savings schedule, y^  the level of nominal income, and i(r^ ) the 
demand schedule for investible resources or the marginal efficiency 
of capital function. 
Within this system of four equations and four unknowns, Keynes 
considers M^ , L(r^ ), s (that is, the functional form for S^ ) and i 
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(that is, the functional form for I^ ) to be the "determinants" of 
the system and the quantity of savings, investment, and national 
income to be the "determinates" of the system. (See Keynes 1964, 
pp. 183-184.) The model works by and L(r^ ) first determining r^  
in a bloc recursive manner. With r^  established, y^  adjusts in such 
a manner so as to equate the level of savings in the economy with 
the level of investment compatible with the already established 
level of r^ . 
Before performing some comparative static exercises on this 
model, two additional points should be made. First, the manner in 
which I have presented Keynes' liquidity-preference theory of 
Interest suggests that it preceded the concept of using the savings 
and investment schedules as the primary determinants of national 
income. But such is not the case. In fact, Keynes first decides 
to use the savings and investment curves as the major explanation 
for the level of income in the economy. He then needs an interest 
rate theory which would be compatible with this savings and investment 
approach, thus the birth of the liquidity-preference theory of 
interest, (see Keynes 1937b, pp. 250). Second, this model 
totally reverses the classical sequence of events which thought of 
the money stock as determining the level of money income and the 
savings and investment schedules as determining the rate of interest. 
As we will see shortly, this has important ramifications for economic 
analysis. 
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a. Some economic implications of a macroeconomic model assuming 
the "special theory" of interest 
1) Assume an exogenously induced Increase in the marginal 
propensity to save If the desire to save among households 
increases, this would imply that the savings schedule would shift 
to the right. At the interest rate established in the money market, 
there would exist an excess supply of commodities. This excess 
supply of commodities would cause the economy to contract. The fall 
in the level of nominal income would then cause the savings schedule to 
shift back to the left, so that equality would again exist between 
the level of planned savings and planned investment at the existing 
level of the interest rate. Thus an increase in the desire to save 
among households is destructive in the sense of causing a drop in 
nominal income. And, of course, a reduction on the part of house­
holds to save would lead to just the opposite conclusion. (See 
Keynes 1964, pp. 184-185, and 210-213.) Furthermore, savings has 
no effect on the rate of interest. 
2) Assume an exogenously induced increase in the marginal 
efficiency of capital If the productivity of capital rises, this 
would be reflected as an upward shift in the marginal efficiency of 
capital schedule. At the existing level of the interest rate, there 
would exist an excess demand for commodities. This would cause the 
economy to expand outward and thus increase the level of nominal 
income. The rise in nominal income would then cause the savings 
schedule to shift to the right, restoring the equality between 
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planned savings and planned investment at the original level of the 
interest rate. An increase in the level of planned investment has 
a positive effect on nominal income. It also causes the quantity 
of savings in the economy to rise. But it has no effect on the 
height of the interest rate. 
b. Some conclusions concerning ^  macroeconomic model constructed 
along the lines of the "special theory" of interest The supply of 
money^ which is a given, along with the liquidity-preference function 
determines the rate of interest in a bloc recursive manner. Once 
the interest rate is established, the level of investment is known 
from the marginal efficiency of capital schedule. Through the 
product market multiplier, a level of nominal income is then 
created such that planned savings equals planned investment. 
Any attempt at raising the level of planned savings in the 
economy causes a contraction of nominal income. Any attempt at 
raising the level of planned investment in the economy causes 
nominal income to expand outward. In either case, the rate of 
interest is never affected by the forces of thrift and productivity. 
And finally, any act of investment creates the savings necessary to 
pay for itself. 
2. A macroeconomic model assuming the "General Theory" of interest 
(See Keynes 1964, pp. 245-254) 
This is the model made famous by Hicks' in his journal article 
"Mr. Keynes and the 'Classics': A Suggested Interpretation". It 
maintains most of the flavor of the "special theory" approach (that 
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is, the destructiveness of savings and the notion that the act of 
investing creates savings necessary to pay for itself) without 
subjecting itself to the charge of being totally unrealistic in the 
sense of not allowing for the forces of thrift and productivity to 
affect the rate of interest. Mathematically, we have 
ât=Li(y^ ) + LgCr^ ), L]^ >0, L'<0, (II.5) 
S=s(y ,r ), s >0, s <0, (II.6) 
 ^ t^ t 
I=i(r^ ), I^  <0, (II.7) 
and S^ =I^ . (II.8) 
The only new terms in the above model are which equals the 
economy's total stock of money and L^ (y^ ) which represents both the 
transactions demand for money and the precautionary demand for money. 
In terms of the rate of interest, this model is no longer bloc 
recursive. In order to determine the level of the interest rate, 
one now has to take account of the desire to save and invest on the 
part of society. 
a. Some economic implications of a macroeconomic model assuming 
the "General Theory" of interest 
1) Assume an exogenously induced increase in the marginal 
propensity to save An increase in the marginal propensity to 
save among households will cause nominal income to decline. The fall 
in nominal income acting through the transactions demand for money 
will then cause the rate of interest to fall, which by way of the 
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marginal efficiency of capital schedule will cause the quantity of 
investment to rise. The net effect of all of this is a drop in 
the level of nominal income, a fall in the rate of interest, and an 
increase in the quantity of investment. 
2) Assume an exogenously induced increase in the marginal 
efficiency of capital A rise in the efficiency of capital would 
cause an expansion of nominal income. This increase in nominal 
income acting through the transactions demand for money would then 
cause a rise in the rate of interest. Both the increase in nominal 
income and the rise in the rate of interest would induce an increase 
in the quantity of savings in the economy. And, of course, just 
the opposite would hold assuming a reduction in the marginal 
efficiency of capital. 
b. Some conclusions concerning a macroeconomic model constructed 
along the lines of the "General Theory" of interest In order to 
determine both y and r requires the use of the money and product 
markets in a non-bloc recursive manner. Again, any attempt at 
increasing the level of savings in the economy leads to an economic 
contraction, while any attempt at increasing the level of invest­
ment in the economy leads to a rise in nominal income. In either 
case, the rate of interest would be affected. And finally, we still 
have the notion that an act of investing creates the savings necessary 
for its payment. 
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D. Some Overall Conclusions Concerning the Liquidity-
Preference Theory of Interest in Both a Partial 
and General Equilibrium Setting 
1. A partial equilibrium setting 
a. The classical theory of the interest rate is wrong since it 
fails to take account of changes in the level of income following 
some change to either the savings or investment schedules or both. 
In addition, using the marginal efficiency of capital schedule as a 
determinant of the interest rate involves circular reasoning. And 
finally, there exist the problems within the classical paradigm of 
the possibility of the savings and investment curves not crossing in 
the positive quadrant in two dimensional space and the important 
issue of how money affects the rate of interest. 
b. What actually underlies the problems with the classical 
approach to the determination of the interest rate is the emphasis 
it gives to the first decision households must make in terms of 
dividing their income between consumption a,nd savings, as opposed 
to the Keynesian or liquidity-preference view which focuses upon 
the second household decision concerning how its chosen level of 
savings will be allocated between holding idle money balances and 
bonds. The primary implication of the classical focus on the first 
household decision is that savings plays an important role in 
determining the interest rate and that interest is a reward for 
waiting. The primary implication of Keynes' liquidity-preference 
view is that the decision to hoard or not to hoard is of 
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primary importance in determining the rate of interest, and one 
might say that interest is a reward for not hoarding as opposed to 
not spending or waiting. 
c. In its "special theory" form, the liquidity-preference 
theory of interest states that the interest rate will adjust in 
such a manner so that society is just willing to hold its speculative 
balances. In its "General Theory" form, the liquidity-preference 
theory of interest states that the interest rate will adjust in such 
a manner so that society is just willing to hold all of its monetary 
balances. 
d. The "special theory" version of the liquidity-preference 
theory of interest excludes the effects of thrift and productivity 
on the rate of interest, while the "General Theory" form of the 
liquidity-preference theory of interest allows for the forces of 
thrift and productivity to affect the rate of interest. 
e. Summarizing one through four, we may say that the liquidity-
preference theory of interest, whether in its "special" or "General 
Theory" forms, is unique and different from the classical theory of 
interest. 
2. A general equilibrium setting 
Combining the "special theory" version of the liquidity-
preference theory of interest with a supply and demand schedule for 
investible resources yields the following results: 
a. The rate of interest is determined in a bloc recursive 
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manner within the speculative demand for money market. Given the 
rate of interest, the level of investment in the economy is then 
determined. Through the product market multiplier, a level of income 
is then generated such that the quantity of savings forthcoming in 
the economy equals the planned quantity of investment given the rate 
of interest previously determined in the money market. 
1) Changes in the supply and demand schedules for 
investible resources have absolutely no effect on the rate of 
interest. 
2) An increase in the propensity to save among households 
causes nominal income to fall in the economy, while a decline in the 
propensity to save among households causes nominal income to expand 
outward. 
3) An increase in the marginal efficiency of capital will 
cause nominal income and savings to both increase. And of course, 
a decline in the marginal efficiency of capital will cause both 
nominal income and savings to fall. Furthermore, the act of 
investing itself creates the savings necessary to finance itself. 
Combining the "General Theory" version of the liquidity-
preference theory of interest with a supply and demand schedule for 
investible resources yields the following results: 
b. The rate of interest and nominal income are determined 
simultaneously in both the money and savings/investment markets. 
1) Changes in the supply and demand schedules for 
investible resources now have an effect on both nominal income and 
the rate of interest. 
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2) An increase in the propensity to save among households 
causes nominal income to fall, the rate of interest to decline, and 
the level of investment to increase. And of course, just the opposite 
hold true for a decline in the propensity to save. So again, even 
within a macroeconomic model that utilizes the "General Theory" 
approach to the determination of the interest rate, savings represents 
a destructive force in the economy. 
3) A rise in the marginal efficiency of capital will cause 
nominal Income to increase, the rate of interest to rise, and the 
level of savings to increase. And for a fall in the marginal 
efficiency of capital, nominal income will decline along with the 
rate of interest and the level of savings. In addition, it is worth 
noting that the act of investment within this model creates the 
savings necessary to finance or pay for itself. 
4) While it is correct to believe within the context of 
this model that changes in the levels of savings and investment 
affect the rate of interest, these effects manifest themselves only 
indirectly through changes in the level of income which then, and 
only then, affect the rate of interest. When the marginal 
propensity to save among households increases, first nominal income 
falls, and then, acting through the transactions demand for money, 
the rate of interest declines. Or for another example, assume 
that the marginal efficiency of capital increases, first nominal 
income expands outward, which again acting through the transactions 
component of the money demand function would cause the rate of 
interest to rise. 
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E. Some Comments on Keynes' Liquidity-Preference 
Theory of Interest In both a Partial and 
General Equilibrium Setting 
1. Hicks 
a. Hicks' comments on Keynes * criticisms of classical economics 
(Hicks 1937, pp. 147-150) In Hicks' article "Mr. Keynes and the 
'Classics': A Suggested Interpretation," Hicks argues that Keynes' 
attack on classical interest rate theory is fallacious. He suggests 
a model of the following form to demonstrate his points: 
\=ky^ ., (II. 9) 
Sj.=s(r^ ,y^ ), (11.10) 
It=i(r^ ), (11.11) 
and S^ =I^ . (11.12) 
Where equation (II.9) is a Cambridge quantity equation. All the 
other symbols and equations have been previously defined. 
In this model, the existing money stock (i.e., M^ ) determines 
money Income (i.e., y^ ) through the velocity term k. Given y^ , the 
savings and investment schedules then determine the rate of interest 
(i.e., r^ ). Theoretically, there is absolutely nothing wrong with 
this model. The savings schedule and the Investment schedule can 
shift around in any manner possible without affecting the level of 
Income in the economy. Thus Keynes' criticism of the classical 
approach to the determination of the interest rate as being 'nonsense 
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theory* because it fails to take account of income effects is 
incorrect. 
Secondly, contrary to what Keynes believed, the classical 
approach to the determination of the Interest rate does provide a 
mechanism by which money may influence the rate of interest. For 
example, by the money stock affecting money income, and money income 
then affecting the savings curve, there exists the linkage by which 
money affects the rate of interest. 
In conclusion, we may say that Keynes* arguments, at least 
his criticisms dealing with the failure of classical interest rate 
theory to allow for the effec changes in the levels of income 
on the interest rate following some change in the savings and 
investment schedules, and his observation that the classical 
approach to the determination of the interest rate makes no allowances 
for the impact of money on the height of the interest rate, are 
themselves wrong. This is not to say that the classical theory of 
interest is correct, but only to note that the wounds that Keynes 
attempted to inflict upon it fell short of their marks. 
b. Hicks' proof of the nonuniqueness of the liquidity-preference 
approach to the determination of the interest rate vis-à-vis the 
loanable funds view (see Hicks 1936, pp. 246-247). Besides trying 
to disembowel Keynes* criticism of the classical theory of interest. 
Hicks attempts to demonstrate why Keynes' liquidity-preference theory 
of interest was in fact not really unique and different than the 
classical or loanable funds view of the determination of the interest 
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rate. Quoting from Hicks, 
"This looks like a most revolutionary doctrine" 
[that is, the liquidity-preference theory of 
interest] "but it is not, I think, as revolu­
tionary as it seems. For over any short period, 
the difference between the value of the things an 
individual acquires (including money) and the value 
of the things he gives up (including money) must, 
apart from gifts, equal the change in his net debt— 
his borrowing and lending. The same will apply to 
a firm. If, therefore, the demand for every com­
modity and factor equals the supply, and if the 
demand for money equals the supply of money, it 
follows by mere arithmetic that the demand for 
loans must equal the supply of loans (when these 
latter are interpreted in a properly inclusive way) . 
Similarly, if the equations of supply and demand 
hold for commodities, factors and loans, it will 
follow automatically that the demand for money 
equals the supply of money" (Hicks 1936, p. 246). 
Furthermore, 
"The ordinary method of economic theory would be to 
regard each price as determined by the demand and 
supply equation for the corresponding commodity or 
factor; the rate of interest as determined by the 
demand and supply for loans. If we work in this 
way, the equation for demand and supply of money 
is otiose—it follows from the rest; and fortunately, 
too, it is not wanted, because we have determined the 
whole price-system without it. But we could equally 
well work in another way. We could allot to each 
commodity or factor the demand and supply equation 
for that commodity or factor, as before; but we 
could allot to the rate of interest the equation for 
the demand and supply of money. If we do this, the 
equation for loans becomes otiose, automatically 
following from the rest..." (Hicks 1936, p. 246). 
And finally, 
"This latter method [that is, allotting the rate 
of interest to the money market] is the method of 
Mr. Keynes. It is a perfectly legitimate method, 
but it does not prove other methods to be wrong. 
The choice between them is purely a question of 
convenience" (Hicks 1936, p. 246). 
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In somewhat more modern terms, we have the following: Assume a 
general Walrasian framework. Let there exist N+1 markets of which N 
are independent. Out of these N+1 markets, N-1 are product markets, 
the Nth being the money market, and the N+lth being the loanable 
funds market. Any one of these markets is otiose. If you eliminate 
the Nth market, you have a loanable funds framework. If you eliminate 
the N+lth market, you have a liquidity-preference model. Either the 
loanable funds or liquidity-preference models will yield identical 
analytical results. Thus, Keynes is wrong in saying that the 
liquidity-preference theory of interest is really something unique 
and different than the traditional loanable funds or classical view 
of the interest rate. Or is he? 
c. Some criticisms of Hicks' remarks concerning the substitut-
ability between the liquidity-preference and loanable funds theories 
of interest We might begin with the quip ascribed to A. P. Lemer, 
where he supposedly asked, "What kind of interest rate theory do you 
have if you eliminate the market for peanuts?" In other words, 
Lerner was suggesting that you cannot use the Walrasian framework as 
a classificatory scheme. At a slightly more sophisticated level, but 
in principle no different than Lerner's remark, D. Patinkin (1985) 
has demonstrated that logically you cannot use Walras' law to classify 
theories according to which equations you include or exclude, since 
in a general equilibrium static framework, all markets acting 
simultaneously are needed to determine all prices. 
But none of this denies the issue of whether or not the liquidity-
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preference theory of interest is really substitutable with the 
loanable funds approach to the determination of the interest rate, 
but only that Hicks' method is invalid. 
But even more important than the failure of Hicks' scheme 
to correctly classify interest rate theories according to which 
market is included or excluded is the fact that Hicks' way of 
looking at the liquidity-preference loanable funds interest rate 
controversy includes two "red-herrings". First, Keynes of the 
General Theory attempted to distinguish between the classical theory 
of interest and his own approach. What this has to do with the 
substitutability between the money and loanable funds market is 
really minimal. As I will demonstrate later on, one must distinguish 
between the substitutability between interest rate theories and the 
substitutability between the money and loanable funds markets. This 
confusing twist, first introduced by Hicks, was one of the most 
unfortunate turns taken in this whole interest rate question. And 
secondly, as stated earlier, Hicks attempts to demonstrate that 
whether one theorized using the money market or the loanable funds 
market, the end result would remain constant. Unfortunately, it 
would seem from what was stated earlier when we studied Keynes' 
arguments, Keynes himself was attempting to distinguish between 
having an interest rate theory based on money demand and supply 
versus one based on savings and investment. Now Keynes of the 
General Theory may have given his readers some reason to think that 
he considered the savings/investment market to be identical with 
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the loanable funds market (see Keynes 1964, p. 165); but in his 
post General Theory writings he distinguished sharply between the 
notions of savings, investment, and the supply and demand for 
loanable funds (see Keynes 1937b, pp. 247-48). Thus, Hicks' attempt 
at refuting Keynes' claim concerning the uniqueness of the liquidity-
preference approach relative to the classical approach concerning 
the determination of the interest rate by showing how the money and 
loanable funds markets are substitutable in a general equilibrium 
setting is a non sequitur. In fact, Keynes could agree with every­
thing that Hicks argued without in the least sacrificing his own 
approach, at least in terms of the differences embodied in thinking 
of the interest rate as being primarily determined by money supply 
and demand versus the savings and investment view. 
d. Some conclusions concerning Hicks' comments Hicks is 
correct in refuting Keynes' claims that the classical approach to 
the determination of the interest rate is illogical and inadequate 
because it fails to take account of income changes due to changes in 
the level of savings and investment; and that furthermore, it fails 
to introduce a pathway for the influences of the money stock on the 
interest rate. 
Hicks also succeeds in demonstrating a method for testing the 
substitutability between the money and loanable funds markets. He 
fails though in using this procedure as an argument in demonstrating 
the substitutability between the liquidity-preference and loanable 
funds theories of interest. In fact, he may be admonished for 
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introducing a confusing twist into the loanable funds liquidity-
preference interest rate controversy. In addition. Hicks interprets 
Keynes' arguments in such a manner as to assume the identity between 
the loanable funds market and the savings/investment market, which 
is incorrect. 
2. Bert Ohlin 
a. Bert Ohlin's criticisms of Keynes' liquidity-preference 
theory of interest Ohlin disparages Keynes' liquidity approach to 
the determination of the interest rate as being too focused on money. 
While Ohlin believes that in final equilibrium society in some sense 
will be just willing to hold the existing monetary stock, he also 
believes that in this final equilibrium state, society will be 
willing to hold all other assets as well. B. Ohlin then queries 
why money should play a more important role in the determination of 
the interest rate than any other asset. Quoting from his article 
"Some Notes on the Stockholm Theory of Savings and Investment," 
"Let me add a few words about the market which is 
given a special position by Keynes, the demand and 
supply for cash and claims 'quickly' convertible 
into cash. It goes without saying, that the 
interest rates existing at any given moment fulfil 
the condition that they make people willing to 
hold as cash—which term in the following includes 
the last-mentioned claims—the total amount out­
standing. But the same is true of all other 
claims and assets" (B. Ohlin 1937, p. 225). 
Some aspects of B. Ohlin's criticism of Keynes' liquidity-
preference approach to the determination of the interest may be 
modified by noting that Ohlin's interpretation of Keynes' interest 
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rate theory would be of its "special theory" form. Again quoting 
from his article dealing with the Stockholm theory of savings and 
investment, 
"whereas Keynes' construction—unless it is inter­
preted in a way which he probably does not accept— 
seems to regard the rates of interest as determined 
largely 'outside' the price system, or at least 
as having almost no connection with the system of 
mutually interdependent prices and quantities" 
(B. Ohlin 1937, p. 225). 
As I have tried to emphasize when discussing Keynes' liquidity-
preference theory of interest, one can find at least two versions 
of his interest rate approach within the General Theory; Its 
"special" and "General Theory" versions. That B. Ohlin chose its 
"special theory" form is not surprising; since much of the General 
Theory is written from the slant of the "special theory" format of 
the liquidity-preference theory of interest, especially the chapters 
in the General Theory dealing with the determination of the interest 
rate. Nevertheless, one must recognize the existence of the 
liquidity-preference theory of interest in its broader version, that 
is, in its "General Theory" form, and when one does this, some of 
B. Ohlin's critique of Keynes' interest rate theory as being too 
focused on money becomes somewhat deflated. 
b. Bert Ohlin's approach to the dètermination of the interest 
rate All of this begs the question though of what sort of 
interest rate approach does B. Ohlin opt for? Ohlin wants to 
substitute for Keynes' liquidity-preference theory of interest the 
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"Stockholm" or "Swedish" theory of interest.^  This is the proposition 
that "the rate of interest is simply the price of credit, and that it 
is therefore governed by the supply of and demand for credit" 
(B. Ohlin 1937, p. 221). Or more extensively, 
"To explain how the rates of interest are actually 
determined, we need, however, a causal analysis which 
runs chiefly in ex-ante terms. What governs the 
demand and supply for credit? Two ways of reasoning 
are possible. One is net and deals only with new 
credit, and the other is gross and includes the out­
standing old credits. The willingness of certain 
individuals during a given period to increase their 
holdings of various claims and other kinds of assets 
minus the willingness of others to reduce their 
corresponding holdings gives the supply curves for 
the different kinds of new credit during the period. 
Naturally, the quantities each individual is willing 
to supply depend on the interest rates. In other 
words, the plans are in the nature of alternative 
purchase and sales plans. Similarly, the total 
supply of new claims minus the reduction in the out­
standing volume of old ones gives the demand—also 
a function of the rates of interest—for the different 
kinds of credit during the period. The prices fixed 
on the market for these different claims—and thereby 
the rates of interest—are governed by this supply 
and demand in the usual way" (B. Ohlin 1937, 
pp. 224-225). 
c. J. M. Keynes' response to B. Ohlin's credit theory of interest 
While the preceding quote by B. Ohlin generated a flurry of arguments 
(see Keynes 1937b) and counter-arguments (see Ohlin, Robertson, and 
Hawtrey 1937) concerning relationship between the supply and demand for 
T^his was Keynes' name for the interest rate approach that Ohlin 
adopted (see Keynes 1937b, p. 241). Ohlin himself never claimed that 
his colleagues at the various Swedish academies endorsed his interest 
rate approach. 
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loans and the supply and demand of savings and investment, its 
critical value was in sparking in Keynes the realization that in its 
present form the liquidity-preference theory of interest ignores the 
needs of businessmen who desire finance in order to expand investment. 
That is, 
"Planned investment, i.e., investment ex-ante, may 
have to secure its 'financial provision' before 
the investment takes place; that is to say, before 
the corresponding saving has taken place. It is, 
so to speak, as though a particular piece of saving 
had to be earmarked against a particular piece of 
investment before either has occurred, before it is 
known who is going to do the particular piece of 
saving, and by someone who is not going to do the 
saving himself. There has, therefore, to be a 
technique to bridge this gap between the time when 
the decision to invest is taken and the time when 
the correlative investment and saving actually 
occur" (Keynes 1937b, p. 246). 
For example, what about the existence of a loanable funds market? 
Again quoting from Keynes, 
"This service may be provided either by the new 
issue market or by the banks; which it is, makes 
no difference" (Keynes 1937b, p. 246). 
Keynes considers this demand for cash or "finance" as resting 
between the active transactions demand for money and the demand for 
idle balances. But more importantly from the perspective of the 
loanable fundists, this acceptance by Keynes for the need to take 
account of "finance" opened the door in Keynes' whole interest rate 
scheme and his view of the macroeconomy to the belief in a loanable 
funds market, where buyers and sellers of credit affect the rate of 
interest and where investment requires its financial provision 
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before it is actually carried out. No more of the silliness that 
investment creates savings, at least when we are inclined to think 
of savings or some part of savings as finance. Keynes considers 
this new component (that is, "finance") of his money demand function 
to be nothing less than the "coping-stone" (Keynes 1937c, p. 667) of 
the liquidity-preference theory of interest, and this new component 
is nothing less and nothing more than the market for loanable funds. 
Quoting from Keynes, 
"It follows that, if the liquidity-preference of 
the public (as distinct from the entrepreneurial 
investors) and of the banks are unchanged, an 
excess in the finance required by current ex-ante 
output (it is not necessary to write 'investment', 
since the same is true of any output which has to 
be planned ahead) over the finance released by 
current ex-post output will lead to a rise in the 
rate of interest; and a decrease will lead to a 
fall. I should not have previously overlooked this 
point, since it is the coping-stone of the liquidity 
theory of the rate of interest. I allowed, it is 
true, for the effect of an increase in actual 
activity on the demand for money. But I did not 
allow for the effect of an increase in planned 
activity, which is superimposed on the former, 
and may sometimes be the more important of the two, 
because the cash which it requires may be turned 
over so much more slowly. Just as an increase in 
actual activity must (as I have always explained) 
raise the rate of interest unless either the banks 
or the rest of the public become more willing to 
release cash, so (as I now add) an increase in 
planned activity must have a similar, superimposed 
influence" (Keynes 1937c, p. 667). 
d. Some conclusions So now we need to recognize by Keynes' 
own admittance a third variation of the liquidity-preference theory 
of interest, one which recognizes a demand for "finance" alongside 
the already established demands for transactions and speculation. 
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One wonders at first blush whether a money demand function comprised 
of these three categories of demand makes any sense? We will see 
shortly that D. H. Robertson considered Keynes attempt to integrate 
a "finance" demand component into his money function a monstrosity 
of the first magnitude. But more on this later when we formally 
discuss Robertson's comments in greater detail. But at this point 
in our analysis one must admit that some of the gloss of Keynes' 
new interest rate approach must be considered partially tarnished 
if it requires the concept of loanable funds to establish its 
legitimacy. 
3. Hi. Robertson 
a. D. H. Robertson's criticisms of Keynes' liquidity-
preference theory of interest One of the earliest and by far 
best known antagonists of Keynes' liquidity-preference approach to 
the determination of the interest rate is D. H. Robertson. Of great 
surprise to the reader of the loanable funds liquidity-preference 
interest rate controversy is the fact that Robertson never did 
reject Keynes' "new" interest rate approach, at least in its 
"General Theory" form. For example, 
"Ultimately, therefore, it is not as a refutation 
of a common-sense account of events in terms of 
supply and demand for loanable funds, but as an 
alternative version of it, that Mr. Keynes' 
account as finally developed must be regarded" 
(D. H. Robertson 1936, p. 183). 
And one year later we have. 
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"Thus I remain of the opinion that Mr. Keynes' 
apparatus and the 'loanable funds' apparatus 
are not 'radically opposed to one another' 
(p. 241) but are alternative pieces of machinery; 
and that what can be (truly or falsely) asserted 
in terms of the other" (Ohlin, Robertson and 
Hawtrey 1937, p. 432). 
And finally, 
"Nevertheless, when we have picked our way 
through these verbal tangles, we are left, I 
think, in no doubt about the relation between the 
two methods of approach. Essentially they are 
two different ways of saying the same thing. 
Mr. Keynes' long-maintained determination to 
treat them as 'radically opposed' has been to 
me from the beginning the most baffling feature 
of this whole controversy" (D. H. Robertson 
1966, pp. 158-159). 
Since Robertson agrees with Keynes on the legitimacy of the 
liquidity-preference approach, then what is all the fuss about 
between these two scholars? Why did Robertson feel it necessary 
to write numerous articles distinguishing between the loanable funds 
and liquidity-preference view of the interest rate? 
1) Robertson's comments on Keynes ' "special theory" 
of interest a) We saw earlier when studying Keynes' arguments 
for the liquidity-preference view of interest, especially in its 
"special theory" form, that one reason Keynes rejected the 
possibility of the marginal productivity of capital affecting the 
rate of interest is that it embodies circular reasoning. Quoting 
from Keynes, 
"Nor are those theories more successful which 
attempt to make the rate of interest depend on 
the 'marginal efficiency of capital'. It is 
true that in equilibrium the rate of interest 
46 
will be equal to the marginal efficiency of 
capital, since it will be profitable to increase 
(or decrease) the current scale of investment 
until the point of equality has been reached. 
But to make this into a theory of the rate of 
interest or to derive the rate of interest from 
it involves a circular argument, as Marshall 
discovered after he had got half-way into 
giving an account of the rate of interest along 
these lines. For the 'marginal efficiency of 
capital' partly depends on the scale of current 
investment, and we must already know the rate 
of interest before we can calculate what this 
scale will be" (Keynes 1964, p. 184). 
This leads Keynes to argue that, 
"The schedule of the marginal efficiency of 
capital may be said to govern the tems on 
which loanable funds are demanded for the 
purpose of new investment; whilst the rate 
of interest governs the terms on which funds 
are being currently supplied. To complete 
our theory, therefore, we need to know what 
determines the rate of interest" (Keynes 
1964, p. 165). 
Robertson then counter argues, 
"The schedule of the marginal utility of tea 
may be said to govern the terms on which tea 
is demanded: whilst the price of tea governs 
the terms on which tea is being currently 
supplied I From the fact that to the individual 
borrower the hiring price of loanable funds is 
a thing to be taken for granted, Mr. Keynes 
appears to proceed, in a way in which he would 
never do if he were speaking of an ordinary 
commodity, to the inference that the price is 
independent of the level of the collective 
demands of the whole body of borrowers; those 
who reject this inference are regarded as 
guilty of some kind of circular reasoning and 
as victims of some kind of elementary confusion 
between a schedule and a price, between a curve 
and a point on a curve.,," (D, H, Robertson 
1966, p. 160). 
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b) As stated earlier, for Keynes, one of the central 
fallacies of the classical theory of interest, (see Keynes 1964, 
pp. 166-167, 174) at least relative to the liquidity-preference 
theory of interest in its "special theory" format, was the belief 
that the payment of interest is a reward for saving or not spending. 
Keynes wanted to make the payment of interest a reward for not 
hoarding. This was in accordance with Keynes' attempt to play down 
the force of thrift as a determinant of the interest rate. 
Not surprisingly, Robertson attacks this sort of view of what 
economic margins of decision making are relevant in terms of the 
rate of interest by the following sort of reasoning, 
"In the first place it seems to be suggested 
that the proposition that the marginal con­
venience of holding money is equated with the 
rate of interest necessarily excludes and 
invalidates the proposition that the marginal 
inconvenience of refraining from consumption 
is equated with the rate of interest. Such 
phrases as that interest is not the reward 
of not-spending but the reward of not-hoarding 
seem to indicate a curious inhibition against 
visualising more than two margins at once. 
A small boy at school is told that if he wins 
a race he may have either an apple or an 
orange: he wins the race and chooses the 
orange. When his mother asks him how he got 
it, must he reply 'I got it for not eating an 
apple?' May he not say proudly 'I got it for 
not losing a race?"' (D. H. Robertson 1966, 
p. 165) 
c) And finally, we have Robertson's direct attack on 
the "special theory" variation of the liquidity-preference theory of 
interest; where this interest rate approach amounts to the prop­
osition that the rate of interest is determined by the demand and 
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supply of hoards with the supply of hoards a given while 
the demand for hoards is considered a negative function of the rate 
of interest. In final equilibrium, the rate of interest adjusts so 
that society is just willing to hold the existing stock of hoards 
or idle balances. Any increase in the quantity of hoards drives 
the rate of interest down by causing some "bull" to become "bearish" 
on interest rates. That is, some speculator goes from believing 
that the rate of interest is going to fall in the future to believing 
that the rate of interest is going to rise in the future. 
In possibly one of the most biting lines ever uttered in the 
history of economics against the thoughts of another scholar, we 
have Robertson's view of Keynes' "special theory" version of the 
liquidity-preference theory of interest: "Thus the rate of interest 
is what it is because it is expected to become other than it is; 
if it is not expected to become other than it is, there is nothing 
left to tell us why it is what it is. The organ which secretes it 
has been amputated, and yet it somehow still exists—a grin 
without a cat" (D. H. Robertson 1966, p. 174). And, "Mr. Plumptre 
of Toronto, in an unpublished paper, has aptly compared the position 
of the lenders of money under this theory with that of an insurance 
company which charges its clients a premium, the only risk against 
which it insures them being the risk that its premium will be 
raised. If we ask what ultimately governs the judgment of wealth-
owners as to why the rate of interest should be different in the 
future from what it is today, we are surely led straight back to 
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the fundamental phenomena of Productivity and Thrift" (D. H. Robertson 
1966, p. 174). 
2) Some conclusions on D. H. Robertson's comments concerning 
Keynes' "special theory" version of the liquidity-preference theory 
of interest Anything of praise we say concerning Robertson's 
observations about the "special theory" form of Keynes' liquidity-
preference theory of interest must be tempered by the fact that no 
one, including Keynes, accepted the basic tenents of this approach 
shortly after the publication of the General Theory. Nevertheless, 
Robertson must be considered essentially right on both the issue 
that the classical theory of interest does not necessarily embody 
circular reasoning and Keynes' refusal to recognize more than two 
margins of choice in his model of decision-making as it relates 
to the determination of the interest rate. In addition, I think 
the quote I made of his biting remark concerning the "special 
theory" form of the liquidity-preference theory of interest 
summarizes Robertson's belief in the emptiness of this sort of 
interest rate approach. 
3) IL. Robertson's comments on Keynes' "General Theory" 
of interest a) One of the major tasks that D. H. Robertson 
feels obliged to accomplish in his diatribes against Keynes' 
liquidity view of the determination of the interest rate is to point 
out how the forces of thrift and productivity are as involved in 
determining the rate of interest in Keynes' story as they are in the 
classical theory of interest. In particular, he attempts to combat 
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statements made by Keynes which imply that the forces of savings 
and investment have absolutely no effect on the rate of interest. 
For example, 
"If we mean by 'hoarding' the holding of idle 
balances, then my theory of the rate of interest 
might be expressed by saving that the rate of 
interest serves to equate the demand and supply 
for hoards—i.e., it must be sufficiently high 
to offset an increased propensity to hoard 
relatively to the supply of idle balances avail­
able. The function of the rate of interest is 
to modify the money-prices of other capital 
assets in such a way as to euqlize the attrac­
tion of holding them and of holding cash. This 
has nothing whatever to do with current saving or 
new investment" (J. M. Keynes 1937b, p. 250). 
D. H. Robertson responds to statements like these by pointing 
out how through the transactions demand for money both the forces 
of thrift and productivity do in fact affect the rate of interest 
by or through their effects on income. But much of Robertson's 
comments on this are really besides the point. When Keynes argues 
that savings and investment do not affect the rate of interest he 
was still arguing for the "special theory" version of his interest 
rate approach. This was soon dropped by Keynes and most everyone 
else for either the "General Theory" approach or the "General Theory" 
approach plus a "finance" demand for money component. 
b) D. H. Robertson is one of the few participants of 
the liquidity-preference loanable funds interest rate controversy 
who concerns himself with the issue of pedagogy. In particular, 
Robertson feels that the loanable funds interest rate paradigm 
"accords with the ordinary language of the marketplace; I do not 
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believe that the bill-broker or the Impecunious schoolboy will ever 
believe that, whatever be the deeper causes of its behavior, the 
rate of interest is anything other than what people have always 
supposed it to be—the price of the use of loanable funds" 
(D. H. Robertson 1966, p. 159). 
And secondly, Robertson worries whether or not the "General 
Theory" version of the liquidity-preference theory of interest did 
not hide from the economist how the forces of thrift and productivity 
affect the rate of interest. Quoting Robertson on this matter, 
"I have suggested that even from the momentary 
market view the Keynesian formulation tends to 
obscure unduly the parts played by Productivity 
and Thrift. Much more is this true when we pause 
to consider the trend of events over considerable 
stretches of time. I remain of opinion that from 
the long-period point of view the most important 
things to be said about the rate of interest are 
not things about 'liquidity-preference' and the 
supply of money, but things about what Marshall 
calls productiveness and prospectiveness" 
(D. H. Robertson 1966, pp. 173-174). 
c) Robertson considers Keynes' attempt at integrating 
a "finance" demand for money into his money demand function to be a 
mistake. Robertson considers the notion of "finance" to be tied or 
linked intimately with the flow of time. He also believes that the 
demand for money function should be associated with a point in time. 
He then queries how these two concepts could ever be linked together 
in a single function. Quoting from Robertson, 
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"In certain more recent writings, to which I 
shall allude further later, Mr. Keynes has 
again rendered clear discussion difficult by 
introducing a number of hybrid concepts, such 
as 'the supply of finance' and the 'supply of 
liquidity', are neither identical with the 
'supply of money' in his sense, since others 
than the banks are conceived of as contributing 
to them, nor identical with the 'supply of 
loanable funds' in my sense, since he attempts 
to bring them into touch not with a flow of 
demand during an interval of time but with a 
state of demand existing at a moment of time" 
(D. H. Robertson 1966, p. 158). 
d) And finally, we have Robertson's attempt at reform­
ulating the sequence of events associated with certain changes in the 
economy. For example, assume there takes place an increase in the 
marginal propensity to save among households. What would occur? From 
a Keynesian perspective you would first expect income to fall. The 
fall in income operating through the money demand function would then 
lead to a lowering in the rate of interest. D. H. Robertson disagrees 
with this sequence of events. He believes that it makes more sense to 
think of the increase in the propensity to save to first cause the 
rate of interest to fall, and then through the money demand function 
and in particular the velocity term of the money demand function to 
then cause income to fall due to the decrease in the velocity of 
of money following the fall in the interest rate. 
4) Some final conclusions concerning D. H. Robertson's 
comments on Keynes' liquidity-preference theory of interest One 
might suppose after all of this that Robertson would have 
absolutely nothing to do with Keynes' liquidity approach to the 
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determination of the interest rate. But, as stated earlier, such is 
not the case. Robertson considers Keynes and his own approach to the 
determination of the interest rate to be formally equivalent. Of 
course we are now talking about the liquidity-preference theory of 
interest in its "General Theory" format. Robertson will have 
absolutely nothing to do with the "special theory" variation of 
Keynes' liquidity theory of interest or that variation of the 
"General Theory" of interest that includes a "finance" component. 
Robertson does disagree with the sequence of events implied by 
the liquidity-preference theory of interest following some shock 
to the system, in particular, how a change in the rate of savings 
sequentially works its way through the economy. He also feels that 
from a pedagogical point of view the loanable funds theory of the 
interest rate is superior to Keynes' approach. And finally, he 
believes Keynes to be wrong in downplaying the forces of thrift 
and productivity in the liquidity approach to the determination of 
the interest rate. 
4. Patinkin 
D. Patinkin makes three contributions to the liquidity-
preference loanable funds interest rate controversy. First, he 
demonstrates formally why one cannot use Hicks' scheme to classify 
interest rate theories. Secondly, Patinkin proves that in a discrete 
time model it makes no sense to distinguish among interest rate 
approaches by claiming that one approach is stock in nature (i.e.. 
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liquidity-preference approach) while the other is flow in nature 
(i.e., loanable funds approach). And thirdly, he demonstrates in a 
dynamic setting that if you make the first order difference equation 
of the rate of interest a function of excess demand in the money 
market it is possible to conceive of situations in which the money 
market implies that the interest rate should move in one direction, 
whereas the bond market implies that the interest rate should move 
in another. For Patinkin, this is an illogical situation that 
should not be allowed to happen. 
a. D. Patinkin's argument against Hicks' interest rate 
classificatory scheme Patinkin begins by stating in a formal manner 
Hicks' proof of the equivalency between the loanable funds theory 
of interest and the liquidity-preference theory of interest; 
1. Assume an economy consisting of N goods. Assume that N-2 
of these goods are commodities. Where the N-lth good are bonds 
and the Nth good is money. By Walras' law only N-1 of the markets 
associated with these goods are independent. 
2. In a general equilibrium analysis of the economy, a model 
consisting of all of the commodity markets and the money market will 
yield the same results as a model consisting of all of the commodity 
markets and the bond market. This follows from Walras' law. 
3. The model consisting of the commodity markets and the money 
market when determining the rate of interest will be called the 
liquidity-preference approach to the determination of the interest 
rate. The model consisting of the commodity markets and the bond 
55 
market when determining the rate of interest will be called the 
loanable funds approach to the determination of the interest rate. 
4. Since we have already demonstrated that the model consisting 
of all of the commodity markets and the money market is formally 
equivalent to the model consisting of all of the commodity markets 
and the bond market, then it follows that the liquidity-preference 
and loanable funds approaches are also equivalent. 
Patinkin then points out that the problem with this scheme 
is when one queries about the interest rate theory being used when 
one of the commodity markets is dropped from analysis. Or to repeat 
Lerner's quip: "And what kind of interest rate theory do we have 
if we eliminate the equation for peanuts?" That is, this classifi­
cation system breaks down if you retain both the bond and money 
markets in your model. For Patinkin, the conclusion to be drawn 
from all of this is not that Hicks is totally incorrect in the 
procedure he utilizes, but just that in a general equilibrium 
static setting there exists one theory of interest, which can 
only be represented by the full set of N markets. 
But in final conclusion, Patinkin states; "Correspondingly, 
if we insist on classifying theories as 'loanable funds' or 
'liquidity preference' according to the equation 'dropped' (though 
the irrelevance of this classification has been demonstrated above), 
then we have demonstrated the equivalency of these two theories" 
(Patinkin 1958, p. 302). 
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b. D. Patinkln's comments on the stock/flow controversy 
surrounding the liquidity-preference loanable funds interest rate 
controversy Following the publication of Fellner and Somers' proof 
of the equivalency of the liquidity-preference and loanable funds 
approaches (Fellner and Somers 1941), which follows rather closely 
the methodology pioneered by Hicks, there arose among academic 
economists a debate on whether or not the real difference between 
2 
these two interest rate approaches was one of stocks versus flows. 
In particular, some economists argue that the Hicksian approach or 
the Fellner and Somers approach to proving the equivalency of these 
two interest rate approaches treat the money market as if it is a 
flow market, when in fact Keynes* thought of the money market in 
stock terms thus rendering the proofs offered by Hicks and Fellner 
and Somers immaterial. 
What Patinkin attempts to demonstrate relative to this 
controversy is that in a general equilibrium setting, assuming end-
of-period analysis, the determination of all the market clearing 
prices may be analysed in terms of the excess demand equations in 
the system. This being the case, then whether one conducts their 
analysis in teirms of stocks or flows is irrelevant. Quoting from 
Patinkin, 
2 
See Fellner and Somers 1949, 1950a and 1950b; Brunner 1950, 
Klein 1950a and 1950b; and Patinkin 1958. 
57 
"We also note that the excess demand for money 
as a stock has the dimensions of a flow. For 
it is the difference between the stock of money 
at two points of time: the end and beginning 
of the week, respectively. This is as it should 
be. For this excess demand can then be properly 
equated—as in equation (5)—to the flows of 
money payments during the week. Furthermore, 
it can readily be shown that this relationship 
holds even after we drop the simplifying assump­
tion that the quantity of money in existence at 
the end of the week equals that at the beginning, 
and permit the existence of a monetary authority 
which can change the stock of money during the 
course of the week. To summarize, though the 
flow demand F*^ " [where F"^  is the demand for 
money as a flow] "is entirely different from 
the stock demand [where is the demand 
for money as a stock] "and though F® is different 
from Mq, the excess demands F^ -F® and are 
identical. Hence any set of prices and interest 
which equilibrates the money market when viewed 
as consisting of flows, must also equilibrate it 
when viewed as stocks, and vice versa. In so 
far as equilibrium analysis is concerned, no 
difference can arise from this difference in 
viewpoints" (Patinkin 1958, pp. 303-304). 
c. D. Patinkin on the dynamics of various interest rate 
adjustment rules As suggested earlier, Patinkin accepts the 
equivalency between the liquidity-preference and loanable funds 
approaches to the determination of the interest rate assuming a 
static general equilibrium setting. Where he begins parting company 
with the belief in the equivalency of these two approaches is when 
one has to begin specifying rules of dynamic change. I also believe 
that one may argue that not only did he reject the equivalency of 
these two interest rate approaches in a dynamic setting, but that he 
opted for the loanable funds view as being at least intuitively more 
realistic. 
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Let us begin with the first proposition that under a dynamic 
setting these two interest rate approaches are not necessarily 
equivalent. Patinkin suggests a comparison between a model in which 
the first order difference equation of the interest rate is a 
positive function of excess demand in the money market and the 
first order difference equation of the price level is a positive 
function of excess demand in the product market (that is, the 
liquidity-preference approach), with a model in which the first 
order difference equation of the interest rate is a positive 
function of excess bond supply in the loanable funds market and the 
first order difference equation of the price level is a positive 
function of excess demand in the product market (that is, the 
loanable funds view). Patinkin then asserts that clearly the 
dynamics associated with these two sets of adjustment rules are not 
equivalent. Thus, in a dynamic setting, the liquidity-preference 
theory of interest is not substitutable with the loanable funds 
theory of interest. 
Patinkin then tries to demonstrate the fundamental implau-
sibility of the liquidity-preference school by studying the 
following situation; Assume a circumstance in which "an excess 
supply of money may be accompanied by such a large excess demand 
for commodities that individuals will attempt to finance their 
additional purchases not only by using up all their excess cash, 
but also by selling part of their bond holdings. In this way, an 
excess supply of money might be accompanied by an excess supply of 
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bonds and hence by an increase in the rate of interest" (Patinkin 
1958, p. 310). "For it is difficult to understand why an excess 
supply of money should drive up the price of bonds even when there 
exists an excess supply of the latter" (Patinkin 1958, pp. 311-312). 
d. Some conclusions concerning D. Patinkin's comments 
Patinkin makes four contributions to the liquidity-preference loanable 
funds interest rate controversy. First, he demonstrates that Hicks' 
classificatory scheme is incorrect in a general equilibrium setting. 
This is not to say that you cannot use Hicks' method to test for 
the substitutability between the money and loanable funds markets, 
but only that you cannot classify interest rate approaches according 
to which market is left out of your story at least as a general 
principle of methodology. Secondly, Patinkin demonstrates within 
an end-of-period model that it makes absolutely no sense to try to 
differentiate between interest rate approaches from the perspective 
that one is a stock theory of interest while one is a flow theory 
of interest. Thirdly, Patinkin proves that in a dynamic setting 
the loanable funds and liquidity-preference theories of interest are 
not equivalent. And fourthly, he shows the potential implausibility 
of the liquidity-preference theory of interest. 
5.  ^Tsiang 
a. S. C. Tsiang's proof of the equivalency between the liquidity-
preference and loanable funds approaches to the determination of the 
rate of interest Tsiang,like Hicks, Robertson, Fellner and Somers, 
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and to some degree Patinkin, accepts the identity between the 
liquidity and loanable funds approaches to the determination of the 
interest rate. For Tsiang, this identity requires that we be able 
to demonstrate 
"that the two sets of demand and supply functions, 
i.e., the demand for and the supply of loanable 
funds, and the demand for money to hold and the 
stock of money in existence [determine] the same 
rate of interest in all circumstances, if both 
sets of demand and supply functions are formulated 
correctly in the ex-ante sense" (Tsiang 1956, 
p. 539). 
Tsiang's proof of this proposition is rather interesting in 
itself. He begins by first expanding Keynes' demand for "finance", 
which Keynes considers to be his "coping-stone" of the liquidity-
preference theory of interest, to cover all active money demand 
balances. Tsiang states, 
"And we must contend that Keynes was confused 
in adding after his concession as to the demand 
for 'finance', almost as a second thought, that 
this demand for 'finance' is quite distinct 
from the demand for active balances which will 
arise as a result of the investment activity 
while it is going on (presumably by which he 
meant the transaction demand for money proper). 
These requirements for finance for all planned 
expenditures actually constitute the whole 
transaction demand for money for the day" 
(Tsiang 1956, p. 547). 
In Tsiang's world the demand for transactions balances are 
all in the form of a demand for "finance". This translates into a 
money demand function of the following form: 
"t = Vt Pt^ t + (11.13) 
61 
where is the price level, is real planned household expenditures, 
is real planned investment, and is planned nominal idle balances, 
so that the demand for money is all in the form of ex-ante uses. 
Nominal planned consumption and investment expenditures represent 
Tsiang's demand for finance, while is planned holdings of hoards. 
For the money market to be in equilibrium, the following condition 
must be met: 
For Tsiang the liquidity-preference theory of interest may be 
represented by equation (11.15). 
What about the loanable funds theory of interest? Let us begin 
with the supply of loanable funds. For Tsiang, the supply of loanable 
funds is equal to the money supply minus nominal household expenditures 
and minus nominal idle balances. This gives us a relationship of the 
following form: 
(11.14) 
Substituting (11.13) into (11.14) we have. 
(11.15) 
(11.16) 
where LF^  represents the planned supply of loanable funds. 
The demand for loanable fund balances is equal to planned 
nominal investment expenditures, so that 
(11.17) 
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where LF^ . is the demand for planned loanable funds. 
In final equilibrium we have 
(11.18) 
Substituting (11.16) and (11.17) into (11.18) yields, after 
transposing terms, 
The loanable funds theory of interest may be represented by 
equation (11.19). 
By inspection, equations (11.15) and (11.19) are identical. 
Thus the liquidity-preference and loanable funds theories of 
interest are identical. 
b. Some implications of S. C. Tsiang's proof I believe 
that Tsiang has raised some interesting points concerning the nature 
of the money demand function. If the demand for money function is 
in fact meant to represent a demand for money that society is 
planning to spend, then why shouldn't it be made equal to planned 
ex-ante expenditures? It does not seem to make sense to equate the 
transactions demand for money to nominal income, which doesn't have 
to equal planned ex-ante expenditures. But then we are left with 
two puzzling phenomena: one, there appears to be absolutely no 
difference between the loanable funds market and the money market, 
which is fine with Tsiang, but I think it would leave most other 
economists a bit uncomfortable; and, secondly, Walras' law, at 
least as it is commonly understood in period analysis, has to be 
rejected. 
(11.19) 
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To better understand this second point, let me explain 
the sort of time framework that Tsiang is working within. Tsiang 
first assumes that all economic decisions are being made within a 
discrete time period framework. Secondly, he assumes that all 
economic decisions are being made at the beginning of the time 
period. Including the decision concerning how much money to hold 
for transactions and idle balance purposes. During any time 
period the plans that are made at the beginning of the period are 
simply carried out. Now the question we are left with is how to 
interpret the money balances that are held as of the end of the 
period? For Tsiang, these end-of-period monetary balances are 
meaningless. They cannot be considered in Tsiang's world a true 
demand for money since they are not being held to finance anything, 
which is Tsiang's criteria for a true transaction balance. What 
does all of this have to do with Walras' law? Tsiang and I believe 
most other economists interpret Walras' law at least relative to 
the money market and, in particular, the money demand component 
of the money market to mean the difference between cash balances 
held at the end of the period by the whole community minus what 
was held by the whole community at the beginning of the period. 
But for Tsiang, money held at the end of the period is a meaningless 
entity. For Tsiang, the demand for money is a beginning period 
phenomenon, and not the difference between the holdings of money 
at the end of the period minus money holdings at the beginning of 
the period. Thus, Walras' law as it is commonly understood within 
64 
a period framework is rejected. Tsiang substitutes a form of Walras' 
law which is more commonly found in continuous time models, in 
particular, where excess demands among bonds and money sum to zero 
regardless of the condition in the product market. 
This version of Walras' law in a discrete time model also 
solves two of the problems first recognized by Patinkin. First, no 
longer do we have to face the somewhat uncomfortable thought of the 
money market implying that the rate of interest will move in one 
direction while the bond market implies that the rate of interest 
will be moving in another direction when the model is out of 
equilibrium. This is due to the fact that under Tsiang*s version 
of Walras' law an excess demand in one of these markets implies an 
excess supply in the other, thus eliminating any ambiguity in the 
directional change taken by the rate of interest. And secondly, 
the dynamic version of our story remains constant whether we 
theorize using the product market and the money market or the 
product market and the bond market. 
One additional important point has to be made. While Tsiang 
has demonstrated the equivalency of the liquidity-preference and 
loanable funds theories of interest, he also argues that the loanable 
funds sequence of events following some shock to the system is the 
correct one to follow. Tsiang draws our attention to either equations 
(11.15) or (11.19) to demonstrate for example that an increase in the 
propensity to save must first affect the rate of interest before it has 
any effect on income, which runs counter to the sorts of stories told 
by Keynesians. 
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c. Some conclusions concerning Tsiang's comments Tsiang 
provides us with an interesting bit of analysis. First, he demon­
strates not only the equivalency of the loanable funds liquidity-
preference theories of interest approach, but also the identity of 
the loanable funds and money markets. Of course, in order to 
accomplish this task he must rewrite the generally accepted form of 
Walras' law in a discrete time period framework. Once all of this 
is accomplished, Tsiang then demonstrates that the sequencing of 
economic events associated with any shock to the system follows 
the loanable funds story. This would also imply that the dis­
equilibrium behavior of a model would not be affected by the fact 
of including or excluding either the loanable funds or money markets. 
And finally, because of how Walras' law is specified, there can never 
exist a situation in which the money market implies a movement in 
the rate of interest which would be in disagreement with what is 
occurring in the loanable funds markets. Of course all of these 
results are dependent on the belief that the money and loanable 
funds markets are one and the same. 
F. Some Overall Conclusions Concerning 
the Liquidity-Preference Loanable Funds 
Interest Rate Controversy 
Let us begin by first trying to clear the deck of all obvious 
wreckage produced by the arguments put forth in this chapter. We 
can begin by rejecting the two primary sources of this interest 
rate controversy; (1) Keynes' attacks against the classical 
66 
paradigm of interest, and (2) Keynes' "special theory" version of the 
liquidity-preference theory of interest. (Within Chapter II of this 
dissertation, see Hicks E.l.a., Ohlin E.2.a., E.2.C., and Robertson 
E.3.a., E.3.a.l), E.3.a.2), E.S.a.S).) This then allows us to reject 
sections C.l.a., C.l.b., D.I., and D.2.a. of Chapter II dealing with 
some of the implications of the "special theory" of interest. In 
addition, we can reject Hicks' approach to proving the identity of 
these two interest rate theories by demonstrating through Walras' 
law the substitutability of the money and loanable funds markets. 
Now let us turn to the problems that still exist. At this 
point in my study, even before we deal with the question of whether 
the liquidity and loanable funds approaches to the determination of 
the interest rate or, more broadly, the macroeconomy, are substitutable, 
we have to decide at least crudely on what the money demand function 
looks like. In particular, we must still solve the problem of 
whether Keynes or Robertson is correct concerning the specification 
of the money demand function. If you remember, Keynes wants to add 
a "finance" component to his transactions and precautionary demands, 
with Robertson arguing that it is not necessary. 
There also exists the problem first introduced during the 
stock/flow controversy surrounding the question of whether the 
liquidity-preference and loanable funds theories of interest are 
in fact substitutable (see footnote 2), and then formalized by 
Patinkin, dealing with the possibility of the money market implying 
that the rate of interest will move in one direction, while the 
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loanable funds market implies that it should move in just the 
opposite direction. For Patinkin, this is a real possibility that 
suggests that one should opt for making the first order difference 
equation of the interest rate a positive function of excess bond 
supply in the loanable funds market when building macroeconomic 
models. I will demonstrate later on that, not only is this a 
distinct possibility, but it constitutes the essence of the approach 
that makes the time path of the interest rate a positive function 
of excess demand in the money market as opposed to excess bond 
supply in the loanable funds market. 
And finally, of the scholars that we have studied, we are still 
left with the arguments put forth by Tsiang. He advocates that 
the only way that these two interest rate approaches (that is, the 
money and loanable funds markets) can be made compatible is by 
rethinking the specification of the money demand function so that 
it is ultimately identical with the loanable funds market. This 
will be an interesting case for us to analyse. 
Furthermore, at this point I do not think it is far-fetched to 
still query whether and under what conditions the liquidity-
preference and loanable funds approaches are or are not substitutable. 
To this ultimate end, and for the purpose of answering the questions 
raised in this conclusion, the following issues will be dealt with 
in the next chapter; 
1. Are the loanable funds and money markets as normally 
specified (that is, minus Keynes' "finance" component" substitutable 
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in a static general equilibrium setting assuming an end-of-period 
model? The settlement of this issue will throw the necessary light 
on whether the money demand function should or should not carry 
with it a "finance" component. It will also partially address 
Tsiang's charge that in order to make these two interest rate 
approaches truly substitutable, the money market must be respecified. 
2. Under dynamic conditions, again assuming an end-of-period 
framework, are the loanable funds and money markets substitutable? 
In addition, what are some of the implications, if any, if they 
are not substitutable? Here, we will be trying to address the points 
raised by Patinkin and Tsiang's arguments. 
3. And finally, we will take up Tsiang's challenge that only a 
money demand function comprised of ex—ante nominal consumption, 
investment, and idle balance holdings makes any sense. 
And now to the next chapter. 
69 
III. THREE SIDE ISSUES IN THE LIQUIDITY-PREFERENCE 
LOANABLE FUNDS INTEREST RATE CONTROVERSY 
A. Are the Money and Loanable Funds Markets 
as Commonly Specified Substitutable Under 
Static General Equilibrium Conditions? 
Let me begin by assuming an end-of-period macroeconomic model 
comprised of three markets; a product market, a loanable funds 
market, and a money market. What I will be trying to accomplish 
in this section is to address the question of whether the money and 
loanable funds markets as commonly thought of are substitutable 
for the purpose of economic analysis within a static general 
equilibrium framework. 
There are at least two ways of proceeding to answer this 
question. Probably the easiest and most direct method would simply 
be to substitute any two of our three markets into Walras' law and 
see what it implies for the shape of the third market. If the 
implied market agrees with our beliefs concerning its form, then 
we could say that any two of these may serve as a model for our 
analysis. The second method of proceeding, which is a bit more 
time consuming, but I believe alot more interesting, is to compare 
the multipliers between different groups of two markets. For our 
problem, the natural comparison would be between the product and 
money market and the product and loanable funds market. But what 
would these multipliers tell us about the substitution between the 
money and loanable funds markets? Well, if the money and loanable 
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funds markets as specified are in fact compatible, then their 
respective multipliers must be the same. At this point, I will 
leave undefined what the expression 'the same' means. Let me go 
forward with this second procedure. 
I'll assume the following two models of the macroeconomy: 
Model I 
= Ct + It + G^ , (III.l) 
= kP^ Y^  + IB^ , (III.2) 
and Model II 
Yt = Ct + It + Gt, (III.3) 
And the following auxiliary relationships: 
VWt - Vt"^ l^ ' V°' Yi<0, (III.5) 
:t=io+T2:t+T3*t' Y2<0' (I::'*) 
IBt=IBQ+Y^ rt, IBQ>0, Y^ <0, (III.7) 
= tYt, 0<t<l, (III.8) 
Gt = Gt, (III.9) 
Pt = Pt' (III.10) 
= Mt» (III.11) 
and 8t = 6^ , (III.12) 
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where = real product, 
= price level, 
= real household consumption, 
= real business investment, 
E real government expenditures, 
0^  = business expectations, 
M® E nominal money supply, 
IB^  = nominal idle balances, 
t H tax rate, 
= real taxes. 
Equations (III.l) and (III.3) are simply the equilibrium 
condition in the product market. Equation (III.2) is the equilibrium 
condition in the money market. And equation (III.4) is the equilib­
rium condition in the loanable funds market. (In support of this 
specification, see Robertson 1933, Tsiang 1956, and Kohn 1981b.) 
S 1 
Where (M^  - IB^ ) of equation (III.4) represents the effective 
S X 
nominal stock of money during t. When we subtract from (M^  - IB^ ) 
nominal household expenditures (P^ C^ ) which are presumed to be intern­
ally financed by the household sector and nominal taxes , we're 
left with the supply of finance that households offer to sell (or loan) 
to the credit market through bond market purchases. The right side 
of (III.4) represents the supply of new bonds to the credit market 
or the demand for finance by the business sector for investment purposes 
(Pj.1^ ) and the government sector to pay for its deficit (P^ ^^ -P^ T^ ). 
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At this point one has to be a bit careful. A loanable funds 
market may be thought of as a bond market. But not all bond markets 
are loanable funds markets. For example, both Patinkin (1965) and 
Crouch (1972) think of bond demand as being positively related to real 
output. But from a loanable funds perspective, bond demand is 
negatively related to real output. 
Let us begin by looking at the business expectations expenditure 
multiplier in Model I. After substituting (III.5) through (III.12) 
into (III.l) and (III.2) we are left with 
and  ^= kP Yj. + IB + Y r . (III. 14) 
Differentiating (III.13) and (III.14) with respect to 
Y^ , r^ , and 5^  yields: 
dY^ =YQdY^ -YQt dY^ + Y^ dr^  + Ygdr^  + Y^ dO^  (III.15) 
and 0 = kP^ dY^  + Y^  dr^ . (III.16) 
Rearranging the terms in (III.15) and (III.16) gives 
us 
(l-Yo+Ygt) dY^  + (-Yi-Ygidft = V®t' (III. 17) 
and (-kP^ )dY^  + (-Y^ )drj. = 0. (III.18) 
From (III.17) and (III.18) the implied business expectations 
expenditure multiplier is 
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dY*. Y3 
— = -^r= > 0. (III.19) 
d0 t 
t (l-Yo+Yot + T-(Yi+Y2) 
4 
Before trying to dissect this multiplier, it is worth 
remembering what type of information we can extract from its form. 
Instead of working with my own language, let me quote from 
L. H. Meyer's textbook. Macroeconomics; A Model Building Approach: 
"[Multipliers indicate] the role of each 
parameter in conditioning the response of 
output to a given disturbance. The response 
of output to any policy action or nonpolicy 
disturbance reflects the interaction of direct 
impacts and the basic model multiplier, and 
the basic multiplier, in turn, reflects the 
interaction of positive and negative feedback 
responses. The direct impact refers to the 
initial effect of the exogenous change on 
aggregate demand and hence on output and 
income. The basic multiplier summarizes the 
income-induced responses which then augment 
or dampen (i.e., multiply) the initial effect 
on income" (Meyer 1980, p. 174). 
Before applying this approach to understanding (III.19) let me 
dr kP dr kP^  
simply substitute - -7^  for in (III. 19) , where - -r^  equals 
t 4^ t 4^ 
and is simply an internal balance condition in the money market. 
Rewriting (III. 19) to take account of - gives us 
dY ? 
—- = -J > 0 (III.20) 
JÔ dr 
t (l-YQ+Ygt) - dY^ Y^3^ +Y2) 
The in the numerator is the direct impact on due to a 
change in 0 , (I-Y.-Ynt) is the positive feedback effect due to 
dr^  
the simple product market multiplier , and - 2^ (Y2+Y2) is the 
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negative feedback effect generated by the financial market (i.e., 
the money market). 
Now let us calculate the same multiplier for Model II. After 
substituting (III.5) through (III.12) into (III.3) and (III.4) we 
have 
and i " 
-Pjtït - P^ Oo+Y^ r^ +Y^ ê,) + (III-22) 
Differentiating (III.21) and (III.22) with respect to Y^ , r^ , 0^ , and 
cancelling P^ tY^  from both sides of (III.22) yields: 
dY^ =YQdYj.-YQtdY^ .+Y^ dr^  + + Y^ dG^ , (III. 23) 
and - ^  dr - Pj^ dY^  + P^ Qt dY^  - P^ Y^ dr^ . 
= PtYgdrc + V3^ ®t* (III. 24) 
After rearranging (III.24) we have 
Y 
<-^ 0^ + + (- - ftYz'd't 
= P^ Yg dë^ . (III.25) 
Redefining and signing the following terms gives us 
Hi = - PJq + Pjpt < 0, (III.26) 
4^ -
and H2 = - - P^ Yi - P^ Yg > 0. (III.27) 
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Substituting (III.26) and (III.27) into (III.25) implies 
H^ dY^  + Hgdr^  = P^ Y^ dë^ . (III.28) 
Now we are ready to calculate the business expectations 
expenditure multiplier in Model II. Combining (III.17) and (III.28) 
gives us 
(l-Yo+Yot)dYt + (-Yi-Y2)drt = Ygdê^ , (III.29) 
and H^ dY^  + Hgdr^  = P^ YgdG^ . (III.30) 
And the business expectations expenditure multiplier from 
(III.29) and (III.30) yields 
(-) 
(+) PtY, 
dY 3^ H ^^ l"^ 2^^  
—  = ^  -0. (III.31) 
Hfl 1 
t (1-T„ + Tjt) + ir(Yi+Ï2) 
(+) 
Before comparing (III.31) with (III.20) let us remind ourselves 
what we are trying to accomplish. We want to see if the money and 
loanable funds markets as commonly specified are substitutable under 
static general equilibrium conditions. This is a question of 
curiosity in itself, but more importantly, it will tell us if Keynes 
was correct in introducing a loanable funds component into his money 
demand function, and if Tsiang is correct in rejecting the idea of 
equation (III.2) being substitutable with equation (III.4) at least 
under static general equilibrium conditions. 
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Our first surprise in viewing (III.31) is our inability to 
on 3 
[V3. 
establish a sign, it. The numerator has both a positive (y^ ) and 
a negative term , while the denominator is positive. 
This ambiguity in the 
loanable funds effect 
sign of (III. 
^^ 3 (Y-r+Yo) 
L =2 '1 
31) is a direct result of the 
. Thus we see that (III.31) 
exhibits an additional direct impact effect (that is, the loanable 
funds effect) relative to (III.20) which influences real output in 
a negative manner. This loanable funds effect is exactly what 
Keynes had in mind when he introduced his "finance" component into 
his money demand function to complement his transactions (kP^ Y^ ) and 
idle balance (IB^ ) components. Thus Keynes appears to be correct 
in that specifying the money demand function as = kP^ Y^  + IB^  
leaves out that demand for money which constitutes the financial 
provision of an investment which is included though in the loanable 
funds market. Tsiang also appears to be right on the mark in 
rejecting the compatibility of equation (III.2) with equation 
(III.4). This is, to say the least, quite a surprising result. 
Remember, though, this result does not say that the money and 
loanable funds markets are not compatible, but just that how they are 
commonly specified by liquidity-preference and loanable funds 
scholars makes them nonsubstitutable. But is this result really 
correct? 
Let us perform another check on the substitutability on these 
two markets as specified before giving the green light to this 
result. As mentioned earlier, we should be able to plug into Walras' 
77 
law any two markets in a three market economy and generate the 
third market in its commonly agreed upon form. 
Performing this task for the product and loanable funds markets 
as specified in this chapter implies: 
+ (P;I; +  ^
IB c H 1 
+ -^ + i = 0. (III.32) 
After cancelling like terms and transposing them we have 
= (M®-kPj.Y^  - IB^ ). (III.33) 
(III.33) tells us that equations (III.l), (III.2) and (III.4) 
are compatible. In particular, it tells us that in static terms 
the money market and loanable funds markets as stated are in fact 
substitutable. What is going on here? 
Let us return to equation (III.31) and substitute (III.26) 
and (III.27) for and H^ . This yields 
—  = —  >0, (III.34) 
dët kP^  
(1-Yo + Tot) + 
which is the same as the multiplier in Model I. Thus in fact the 
money and loanable funds markets are compatible as traditionally 
specified. 
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What conclusions might we reach from this? First, Keynes is 
wrong in believing that his "General Theory" specification of the 
money market needs a loanable or financial funds component to 
counter B. Ohlin's remarks. In a static general equilibrium setting, 
the "General Theory" format of the money market already embodies 
a loanable funds effect at least in terms of ultimate impacts on 
endogenous variables. Robertson's rejection of Keynes' "finance" 
component must be judged correct. 
There is also another issue that is swimming around here. One 
of Robertson's complaints against the money market as a device for 
economic analysis is that it is too compact or dense with information, 
so that it might mislead those who are using it. This appears to be 
a legitimate indictment if the originator of the market in its 
modern form was himself misled. 
And finally we can say to Tsiang, that at least in a static 
setting, these two markets (that is, the money and loanable funds 
markets) as commonly specified are in fact compatible. 
B. Are the Money and Loanable Funds Markets as 
Commonly Specified Substitutable 
Under Dynamic Conditions? 
We earlier stated that one problem that Patinkin found with 
the money market, and in particular with making the first order 
difference equation of the rate of interest a function of excess 
demand in the money market, was the possibility of a situation arising 
in which there might be an excess supply of money along with an excess 
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supply of bonds coupled with an excess demand in the product 
market. In this case, the money market would imply a fall in the 
rate of interest. Patinkin then wonders if it ever makes sense to 
have the rate of interest falling while there exists an excess 
supply of bonds - which would indicate a rise in the rate of 
interest. 
What I will demonstrate in this section is that these sorts 
of cases are not peculiarities of a dynamic model in which the first 
order difference equation of real output is made a function of 
excess demand in the product market and the first order difference 
equation of the interest rate is made a function of excess demand in 
the money market, but instead represent the very essence of this case. 
Also in this section we will still be on the trail of Tsiang's 
rejection of the compatibility between the money and loanable funds 
markets as usually specified. We will want to check if these two 
markets are in fact substitutable in a dynamic environment. 
Let us begin with the straightforward question dealing with 
the substitutability between the money and loanable funds markets 
in a dynamic setting. What we will want to do is compare the 
following two dynamic models; 
Model III 
(Yt+r^ t) = Kl(Yt-Ct-It-Gt)' (III.35) 
(^ t+l'^ t) " KgCM^ -kP^ Y^ -IB^ ), KgO, (III.36) 
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and Model IV 
Ki<0, (III.37) 
= KsfPtlt+ftGt -%-- + -%- + (III.38) 
Are these two models identical? Or in other words, are the 
money and loanable funds markets substitutable in a dynamic setting? 
Let us begin by looking at how a change in the level of government 
expenditures might impact on and in the early stages of the 
evolution of both of these variables within these two dynamic 
frameworks. 
Beginning with Model III, how would an increase in the level of 
government expenditures affect and r^ ? To begin with, an increase 
in will impact directly on the product market causing an excess 
demand to exist. We know by Walras' law there has to exist an 
excess supply somewhere else. Since government expenditures are 
not a direct argument in the money market it cannot affect an excess 
supply here, and rightfully so, for this would imply a fall in the 
rate of interest associated with a rise in government spending, 
which is a situation that is not very convincing. So where is our 
excess supply? It has to be in the loanable funds market. Keep in 
mind that in Model III, the loanable funds market is still in 
existence, but represents a background player. 
This gives us an initial situation of excess demand in the 
product market and excess supply in the loanable funds market. The 
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excess supply in the loanable funds market cannot generate any 
interest rate changes based on Model III. Thus, the first thing 
that must occur is an expansion in real output. This would then 
lead to a situation of excess demand in the money market which 
would then begin putting upward pressure on the rate of interest. 
What early sequence of events might we expect to see in 
Model IV following an increase in governmental expenditures? To 
begin with, the rise in government expenditures will impact directly 
in both the product and loanable funds markets, creating an excess 
demand in the product market and an excess supply in the loanable 
funds market. But more importantly, in this case the interest rate 
will rise along with the increase in real output. This differs 
substantially from the sequence generated in Model III. 
Thus we can conclude that these two dynamic models are not 
substitutable, and that the money and loanable funds markets as 
specified are not compatible under dynamic circumstances. 
Tsiang appears to be correct in insisting that the money market 
should be rewritten in order to guarantee its compatibility with 
the loanable funds market, at least from a dynamic perspective. 
But is he? 
Let us go back to Walras' law again and substitute (III.37) 
and (III.38) into it. This would imply 
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Rewriting (III.39) so that 
""t+r^ t = - (Mt - Mt) -
t^+r^ t ( % ) K3. (III.40) 
Combining (III.40) with (III.37) and making the necessary 
substitutions will yield the same dynamic sequence by Walras' law 
that (III.37) and (III.38) implies (see Patinkin 1958). Let us test 
this statement. Again assume an increase in governmental expenditures. 
Equation (III.37) implies an excess demand in the product market. 
Furthermore, since is negative and is positive, and (M^ -M^ ) 
equals zero if we assume we are starting from an overall point of 
equilibrium, then (r^ ^^ -r^ ) will be positive simultaneously with the 
expansion in real output. Thus we see that the money and loanable 
funds markets as commonly specified are substitutable in a dynamic 
setting if the appropriate adjustment mechanisms are specified. 
So again we may reject Tsiang's arguments dealing with the non-
compatibility between the money and loanable funds markets as typically 
expressed. 
Let us now turn to Patinkin's case of the possibility of the 
loanable funds market implying that the rate of interest should move 
in one direction while the money market tells us that in fact it 
will move in just the opposite direction. When you specify the first 
order difference equation of the interest rate in a manner like 
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equation (III.36), this case is not just a peculiar possibility, 
but represents the very essence of Model III. The loanable funds 
market can be out of equilibrium every which way, but the interest 
rate will not change if the money market is clearing. 
The preceding analysis also allows us now to clarify some of 
the issues that were raised in the introduction to this dissertation. 
If you remember I compared a model comprised of a product market 
and a money market with one consisting of a product market and a 
loanable funds market. At that point I described some shocks to 
both of these models and queried in what sense could the money and 
loanable funds markets be considered substitutable if they generate 
different sequences of events. We see now that the differences in 
the stories told between these two models really had nothing to do 
with which markets we included or excluded, but only with the 
dynamic structures assumed. In particular, in the model consisting 
of the product market and the money market, I assumed a dynamic 
structure like Model III. And in the model composed of the product 
market and the loanable funds market I assumed a dynamic structure 
in which the first order difference equation of output is a positive 
function of excess supply in the money market and the first order 
difference equation of the interest rate is a positive function of 
excess supply in the loanable funds market. 
In addition, again in the introduction to this dissertation, I 
wondered about the impression that many ISLM model builders give in 
terms of associating the change in rate of interest with both the 
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money and loanable funds markets, and how this procedure might 
generate ambiguous results. We now see that this can be done if 
one is careful in specifying their dynamic interest rate equation. 
In particular, equations (111,38) and (III.40) are perfectly 
compatible. 
C. Is It Possible to Make Sense of a Money 
Demand Function as.Expressed in Its 
"General Theory" Form? 
I think Tsiang would give us a resounding no to the title of 
this section. He would argue that not only are the money and loanable 
funds markets not substitutable under all conditions (in particular, 
when we look at the dynamic sequencing of economic events), but that 
the money demand function when specified as depending on nominal 
income and the rate of interest makes almost no sense. Since we 
have proven that the money and loanable funds markets are in fact 
substitutable under all conditions, we can concentrate on this 
second issue which has been raised. 
Let us rehash briefly Tsiang's argument. The demand for money is 
a demand primarily to hold cash balances which society is planning 
to spend. These planned expenditures are comprised of nominal house­
hold, business, and government spending (that is, P^ C^ +P^ I^ +P^ G^ ). 
Now comes the subtle point. Ex-ante, planned social spending does 
not have to equal nominal income. Rewriting the money demand 
function to reflect all of this gives us 
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Is Tsiang correct? His argument appears sound. But is it? We 
should also be keeping in mind that if we accept Tsiang's analysis, 
we are reduced to viewing the money and loanable funds markets as 
basically one and the same. 
Since Tsiang claims to be operating within a Robertsonian 
framework, let us see if we can make sense of the money demand 
function as normally specified within this same framework. 
Assume the following Robertsonian model: 
= Cc + If + Gf, (III. 42) 
W/P^  = f^ , (III.43) 
+ IB^ , (III.44) 
and = f(N^ ). (III.45) 
Equation (111.42) is the condition for equilibrium in the product 
market, where the supply of available commodities (Y^  ^ ) within a 
Robertsonian framework represents an inheritance from the preceding 
period. Equation (III.43) represents equilibrium in the labor market, 
while equation (III.44) represents equilibrium in the money market, 
and finally, (III.45) is the economy's aggregate production function. 
Now the real issue is whether the term  ^in (III.44) has some 
meaningful content. First note that there is no velocity symbol 
associated with P^ Y^  ,. This is because in a Robertsonian framework 
t t-1 
the period under study has a velocity of money other than idle 
balances equal to one. This really poses no problem for us. One 
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could just as easily extend the story to include a velocity term 
greater than one. But again, what does  ^represent? According 
to Tsiang, it cannot really mean anything. But I don't think this 
is really correct. In this framework, the product available for 
sale during the period under inspection was produced in the preceding 
period. The product being produced during this period will be 
available next period. Business firms^  though^ must make resource 
payments on the product being produced today. The money they use 
to make these payouts from is That is, P^ Y^ _^  can be 
considered an end-of-period demand for money by business firms for 
the purpose of paying their wage and profit bills. Of course, 
someone might note that P^ Y^  ^  is not exactly the term used in most 
money demand functions. This can be corrected by rewriting (III.42) 
through (III.45) as 
= Cj. + Ij. + G^ , (III.46) 
W/P^  = fjj, (III.47) 
M® = PJ^  + IB^ , (III. 48) 
and Y = F(N). (III.49) 
Where (III.46) through (III.49) represents a longer run version of 
(III.42) through (III.45). In particular, it represents the medium 
run of the Robertsonian framework. And again, P^ Y^  represents the 
demand for money balances by business firms to pay off its resource 
commitments. 
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D. Some Overall Conclusions 
Concerning Chapter III 
First, the money and loanable funds markets as traditionally 
specified are substitutable in both a static and dynamic framework. 
Secondly, making the first order difference equation of the interest 
rate a function of solely excess demand in the money market leads 
to a different implied sequencing of events than if the first order 
difference equation of the interest rate is made a function of 
solely excess bond supply in the loanable funds market. But this 
has nothing to do with which markets are included or excluded 
explicitly in our models. And finally, Tsiang is wrong in arguing 
that the money demand function when expressed as depending on 
nominal income makes little sense, if the nominal income component 
of the money demand function is interpreted as a business demand 
for money in order to pay its resource bills for the period under 
discussion. 
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IV. ARE THE LIQUIDITY-PREFERENCE AND LOANABLE 
FUNDS THEORIES OF INTEREST DIFFERENT? 
Our answer to this question depends on how we perceive, or, 
more appropriately, what we perceive these two theories to mean. If, 
like so many of the participants to the liquidity-preference loanable 
funds interest rate controversy, we think of these two interest rate 
approaches as being tied into which market is included or excluded 
from our analysis, then these two competing interest rate theories 
are one and the same. 
But if we consider the implied sequencing of economic events 
associated with these two interest rate approaches following some 
exogenous change in the economy, then I think obviously the liquidity-
preference and loanable funds theories are not substitutable. Tradi­
tionally, it has been common to associate with the liquidity-
preference theory of interest a dynamic structure that makes the time 
path of the interest rate solely a function of excess demand in the 
money market, and to relate the loanable funds theory of interest to 
a dynamic setting which makes the time path of the interest rate 
solely a function of excess bond supply in the loanable funds market. 
Certainly, when we then combine both of these dynamic equations with 
the appropriate dynamic equation in the product market we end up 
with two distinct models as explained earlier. But I do not believe 
that this really represents the difference between these two interest 
rate approaches. 
89 
If we take D. H. Robertson as our representative of the 
loanable funds school, let me quote from him concerning his 
perceived sequence of events following a change in the marginal 
propensity to consume assuming that the idle balance function 
depends solely on the interest rate, 
"If there exists for the community as a whole 
a negatively inclined curve of 'liquidity-
preference proper' (LL., Fig. II), some part 
of the additional savings devoted by individuals 
to the purchase of securities will come to rest 
in the banking accounts of those who, at the 
higher price of securities, desires to hold 
an increased quantity of money. Thus the fall 
in the rate of interest and the stimulus to 
the formation'of capital will be less than if 
LL were a vertical straight line, and the 
stream of money income will tend to contract" 
(Robertson 1936, pp. 188-189). 
The dynamic model behind this quote is one in which the rise in 
the rate of interest is a negative function of excess.demand in the 
bond market and the rise in output is a negative function of excess 
demand in the money market, so that a decrease in the marginal 
propensity to consume leads to an excess supply in the product market 
and an excess demand in the bond market. The excess demand in the 
bond market causes the interest rate to fall. At this point, output 
has not been affected. The decline in the interest rate by decreasing 
the opportunity costs of holding money leads to an excess demand in 
the money market. The excess demand in the money coupled with the 
excess supply in the product market then causes output to decline. 
This is my interpretation of the loanable funds sequence. All 
changes (except in the money supply) in the economy affect output by 
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first affecting the rate of interest. 
In conclusion, we can say that the liquidity-preference theory 
of interest from a dynamic perspective associates the time path of 
real output with excess demand in the product market and the time 
path of the interest rate with excess demand in the money market, 
while the loanable funds approach makes the time path of real 
output a function of excess demand in the money market and the time 
path of the interest rate a function of excess bond supply in the 
loanable funds market. These dynamic models imply Important 
differences concerning not only the sequencing of events in the 
economy, but the role of the interest rate in transmitting shocks 
to the real economy. 
The question I would like to now ask is whether we can imagine 
a meaningful difference between these two interest rate approaches 
that might manifest itself in a static environment? I believe the 
answer to this question is yes. For example, from a loanable funds 
slant the idle balance component of the loanable funds market [see 
equation (III.4)] does not necessarily have to be solely a function 
of the interest rate (see Kohn 1981b). This change in the specifi­
cation of the idle balance function can lead to some interesting 
results. To see this, let us compare the following two models after 
a change in the marginal propensity to consume takes place, where 
Model V we'll associate with the liquidity-preference theory of 
interest and Model VI will represent the loanable funds approach. 
Stating these two models we have 
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Model V 
= Cy + ly + G^ , (IV.l) 
 ^= kP^ Y^  + IB^ , (IV.2) 
and Model VI 
\= Gy, (IV.3) 
M^  = kP^ Y^  + IB^  . (IV.4) 
Now we see that the only difference between these two models 
will be how the idle balance term is specified. Let me first rewrite 
Model V assuming that it's equivalent to equations (III.13) and 
(III.14). After making all the appropriate substitutions we have 
?t = Co + YgYt - Yof^ t + Yl^ t + IQ + Yz't 
+ Ygëc + (IV.5) 
and M® = kP^ Y^  + IBg + (IV.6) 
Let us now differentiate (IV.5) and (IV.6) with respect 
to Y^ , r^ , and Yq* This implies 
dY, = dToY; + TofTt -
- Ygt dY^  + Y^ dr^  + (IV.7) 
and 0 = kP^  dY^  + Y^ dr^ . (IV.8) 
9 2  
Rearranging terms in (IV.7) and (IV.8) gives us 
(I-YQ + Yot)dYj. + (-Y^ -Y2)dr^  + dYq, (IV.9) 
and (-kP^ )dY^  + (-Y^ )dr^  = 0. (IV.10) 
From (IV.9) and (IV.10), the marginal propensity to consume 
output multiplier is 
This result, that an increase in the rate of savings (or a 
decrease in the marginal propensity to consume) in the face of 
unemployment leads to an economic contraction, is so well grounded 
in the economics literature that it is hard to imagine a situation 
where it would not hold true. The sign on (IV.11) is also closely 
linked with Keynes' General Theory and the liquidity-preference 
theory of interest. 
Now let us turn to the loanable funds model. As I stated 
earlier, from a loanable funds perspective there really is no reason 
for making the idle balance component of the money demand function 
depend solely on the rate of interest. In Model V, the idle balance 
component is usually thought of as a speculative component of money 
demand, and thus its association with the liquidity approach to the 
determination of the interest rate. Let me rewrite the idle balance 
function from a possible loanable funds view: 
kPt 
(I-YQ + Ygt) + —(Yi+Yg) 
>  0 .  (IV.11) 
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IB^ =IBQ+Y^ r^ -h'5PtC^ .IBo>0, Y4<0, Y5>0. (IV.12) 
In this case, the idle balance function is also positively 
related to nominal consumption. We can think of this as a "rainy 
day" reserve. 
After substituting (III.5) into (IV,12), and (IV.12) into 
(IV.4), and rewriting (IV.5) we have 
and + IBg + + YjPjC^  
+ ïjPtVt - <"•"> 
Differentiating (IV.13) and (IV.14) with respect to Y^ , 
r^ , and Yq yields 
= dT0?t + Yo4?t: - 4T0t?t 
- Ygt dY^  + Y^ dr^  + Ygdr^ , (IV. 15) 
and 0 = kPj.dY^ +Y^ dr^ +Y3Pj.dYQYj. 
ïj+YjP^  dr^ . {IV.16) 
Rearranging terms, we get 
(l-YQ+YQt)dY^  + (-Yi-Y2)dr^  = Y^  dYg, (IV.17) 
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and (-kP^ -YgP^ Yo+YgPtYo^ )^ t^ 
= (YgPt - YgPttY^ ) dYg. (IV.18) 
From (IV.17) and (IV.18) the implied marginal propensity to 
consume output multiplier is 
(+) ? (-) 
t^^ "V^ 5^ t^  + YiY5PJ^ .(l-t) + 
dY; YzYsf^ Y^ Cl-t) 
- 0. (IV.19) dYg (+) (-) (-) (+) < 
(+) (+) (+) 
-kPjYi+Yz) - YgYiY^ P^ d-t) - YgYgYgP^ d-t) 
This is not an illusionary result like (III.31). Even after 
performing stability analysis on Model VI, the best one can do is 
say that in order for Model VI to be stable, the denominator in 
(IV. 19) must be positive and so must (-Y^ -YgP^ ). This still leaves 
us with an ambiguous sign. So from a loanable funds specification 
of the idle balance function, an increase in the rate of savings even 
in the face of unemployment might prove expansionary. 
I believe that this represents a powerful and important difference 
between the liquidity-preference and loanable funds views. Let me 
quote Keynes on this matter, 
"The reader will readily appreciate that the 
problem here under discussion is a matter of 
the most fundamental theoretical significance 
and of overwhelming practical importance. 
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[Keynes' is referring to his attack on 
classical interest rate theory.] For the 
economic principle, on which the practical 
advice of economists has been almost invariably 
based, has assumed in effect, that cet. par., 
a decrease in spending will tend to lower the 
rate of interest and an increase in investment 
to raise it,... A decreased readiness to spend 
will be looked on in quite a different light 
if, instead of being regarded as a factor which 
will, cet. par., increase investment, it is 
seen as a factor which will, cet. par., diminish 
employment" (see Keynes 1964, pp. 184-185). 
Let us inspect one more additional multiplier that might prove 
interesting within the loanable funds framework. It is a well 
established result of Model V that an increase in the tax rate level 
will prove contractionary. Let us see how this result might differ 
within Model VI. 
First differentiate (IV.13) and (IV.14) with respect to Y^ , r^ , 
and t. This implies 
dYj.=Yo<iYj. - YgdtY^  - YgtdY^  + Y^ dr^  + Ygdr^ , (IV.20) 
and 0=kP^  dY^  + Y^ dr^  + dY^  
-YsPtYodtYt - YsP^ YQ tdY^  + 
5^ ^  dr^ . (IV.21) 
Rearranging terms in (IV.20) and (IV.21), we get 
(^"V^Ot^'^^t + (-Yi-Y2)4rc = "Vt'^f (IV.22) 
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and (-kPt-YgPtYo + y^ 7^ yQy)dY^  + (-Y^ -Y5P^ )dr = 
"Vt'*'0 (IV. 23) 
The tax rate output multiplier from (IV.22) and (IV.23) 
implies 
(+) (+) (-) 
"t Wt (TS-YI^S - + Wt > „ 
dt (-> (-) (+) ; 
-^ 4 + 70^ 4(1-^ ) + YoY5P^ (l-t) -
(+) (+) 
(+) (-) 
- kPt(Yi+Y2) - (IV. 24) 
Again the sign on (IV.24) is ambiguous. 
In conclusion to the arguments put forth so far, we can say 
that there exist at least two major differentiating factors between 
the liquidity-preference and loanable funds schools. First, in a 
dynamic setting, as one might expect from the loanable funds approach, 
the loanable funds market and the interest rate are placed squarely 
in the center of all analysis. Almost every nonmonetary event affects 
the real economy by first changing the level of the rate of interest. 
This is in contradistinction with the liquidity-preference view, 
which I would argue makes the product market the key player in Its 
story. Let me cite an example to demonstrate this difference. Assume 
that for whatever reasons, the marginal efficiency of capital rises. 
97 
From a liquidity-preference view, this change would first impact 
directly on the product market, causing real output to increase. The 
rise in real output then operating through the money market would 
cause the rate of interest to rise. How might these events be 
modified in a loanable funds setting? First, the rise in the marginal 
efficiency of capital operating through the loanable funds market 
would first cause the interest rate to increase. It is then this 
rise in the interest rate which proves to be the vehicle of economic 
expansion by increasing the opportunity costs of holding money. 
From a loanable funds perspective, the increase in real output 
following the rise in the efficiency of capital is due to the 
increase in the interest rate, at least in the short run. Secondly, 
we noted that even in a static environment one could visualize a 
meaningful difference between these two interest rate approaches. 
From a loanable funds view, there really is no reason to exclude all 
arguments besides the interest rate from affecting idle balances. 
We studied briefly the implications of including nominal household 
expenditures in the idle balance function and demonstrated how this 
rather innocuous-looking change could potentially turn some of the 
implications of the liquidity-preference approach on its head. 
Before leaving this chapter, there is one more additional 
issue that must be dealt with, and that is the formal relationship 
between the two interest rate approaches we have been studying and 
the money and loanable funds, markets. The answer to this question 
depends on what we mean by the expression "formal relationship". 
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Historically, economic scholars have intimately linked together 
these competing interest rate theories and the explicit inclusion 
or exclusion of the money and loanable funds markets in these models. 
From my perspective, the linkage between the liquidity-preference 
theory of interest, the loanable funds theory of interest, and the 
explicit utilization of the money and loanable funds markets 
respectively in the model-building process is nonexistent. Of course, 
as I stated earlier, in a dynamic setting the loanable funds market 
plays a major role in the loanable funds theory of interest which 
cannot be found in the liquidity approach. But this has nothing to 
do with which markets are explicitly written down in one's model. 
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V. LIQUIDITY-PREFERENCE OR 
LOANABLE FUNDS? 
A. The Views of Alex Leijonhufvud 
The most recent entry into the liquidity-preference loanable 
funds controversy is A. Leijonhufvud (1981) (see in particular his 
chapter seven). Leijonhufvud considers the theory of the interest 
rate mechanism to be central to much of the confusion that exists in 
economics between the Wicksellian (of which Keynes' General Theory 
is an offshoot) and Monetarist schools of thought. Quoting 
Leij onhufvud, 
"In Wicksell's theory of the cumulative process, 
the maladjustment of the interest rate—the 
discrepancy between the market rate and the 
natural rate—is the central idea. It is also 
the idea that motivates the analysis of changes 
in the price-level (or in nominal income) in 
terms of saving and investment. It is a simple 
but fundamental point. Use of the saving-
investment approach to income fluctuations is 
predicted on the hypothesis that the interest 
rate mechanism fails to coordinate saving and 
investment decisions appropriately. This is 
where all the Wicksell Connection Theories 
[including the General Theory] differ from 
Monetarism. In Monetarist variants of the 
Quantity Theory, saving and investment have to 
do with the allocation of output but nothing 
to do with the determination of aggregate 
income or the price level. This is true 
because Monetarist theory assumes that the 
interest rate mechanism can be relied upon to 
coordinate the intertemporal decision of house­
holds and firms. Some twenty years of IS-LM 
exercises and applied econometrics failed to 
isolate this point as fundamental to the 
Monetarist controversy" (Leijonhufvud 1981, 
p. 132). 
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But what exactly is this Wicksellian idea and how does it 
relate to the liquidity-preference theory of interest? 
"The original idea is simple. In allocation 
theory, we learn that household savings 
decisions and entrepreneurial investment 
decisions are to be coordinated by the 
interest rate mechanism. In money and banking, 
we learn that 'the' interest rate is governed 
by the supply and demand for securities (or 
of 'credit'). Imagine a situation where the 
interest rate cannot do both jobs at once, 
i.e., in which that level of real interest 
that equates the supply and demand for 
securities does not serve to equate saving 
and investment. What could be the causes of 
such a maladjustment? What might be its 
consequences?" (Leijonhufvud 1981, p. 133) 
According to Leijonhufvud, Keynes' liquidity-preference theory 
of interest so "obfuscated" the interest rate mechanism that this 
Wicksellian theme was lost sight of. But this begs the question of 
why we should care? So we lost sight of this Wicksellian theme. 
What does it really matter? 
For Leijonhufvud, the only meaningful alternative to 
Monetarist economics is the construction of macroeconomic models 
that uses this Wicksellian theme. Quoting from Leijonhufvud, 
"Most obviously, perhaps, the failure to grasp 
the role of the Wicksellian maladjustment of 
interest rates in Keynes' theory of unemployment 
has caused the Keynesians more difficulty than 
necessary in marking out for themselves a 
theoretically justifiable answer to the Natural 
Rate of Unemployment doctrine. A 'Keynesian' 
answer to this doctrine would be that unemploy­
ment will not converge to its natural level 
unless the interest rate goes to its natural 
level - and that the latter condition will not 
always be fulfilled [This position, has recently 
been refuted by Kohn]" (Leijonhufvud 1981, p. 135). 
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[And] another consequence of [this interest rate] 
muddle is the, at least, occasional failure of 
Keynesians to come to Monetarist conclusions 
under the appropriate conditions. Whenever the 
market rate of interest keeps to its natural 
level—and, surely, they do not always diverge?— 
the Keynesian Model should reduce to a Monetarist 
one. In failing to bring this out, Keynesians 
have allowed the simplest and most important 
lessons of monetary experience to come to be 
regarded as quintessentially Monetarist insights" 
(Leijonhufvud 1981, pp. 135-136). 
At this point, we might want to ask what it is exactly that 
Leijonhufvud sees in the liquidity-preference theory of interest 
that "obfuscates" the interest rate mechanism. For Leij onhuf vud, 
the liquidity-preference theory of interest is the notion that it's 
the excess demand for idle or speculative balances that governs 
the rate of interest. This notion, in combination with his beliefs 
that Keynes of the General Theory totally eliminated the loanable 
funds market from his analysis and always assumes the identity between 
savings and investment,totally eliminates the Wicksellian problem. 
This forces Leij onhufvud to reject the liquidity-preference 
approach and adopt "a basic D. H. Robertson Loanable Fund Theory" 
which in conjunction with the other standard markets of a macro-
economic model allows Leijonhufvud to argue that 
"Unless the real rate of interest goes to its 
natural level [a concept made foreign by Keynes' 
liquidity-preference theory of interest], 
unemployment will not home in on its natural 
level. This is true also of a system with an 
operative labor market mechanism. If and when 
the system fails to coordinate intertemporal 
activities by adjustment of intertemporal 
prices, the 'flexing' of money wage rates in 
response to excess supply of labor will not 
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guarantee a return to full employment. This 
is ground on which the Keynesians could base 
their opposition to the Monetarist doctrines 
of strong stability of the system in its real 
variables, the 'vertical' Philips curve at 
the natural rate of unemployment and to the 
associated structures against discretionary 
policy actions" (Leijonhufvud, p. 185). 
Thus, Leijonhufvud could be said to opt for the loanable funds 
approach. But as stated earlier, one is troubled with Leijonhufvud's 
interpretation of Keynes' liquidity-preference theory of interest. 
He (Leijonhufvud) interprets the liquidity theory of interest 
primarily in its "special theory" form. I think that this must force 
us to downplay or at least cause us to rethink his rejection of 
Keynes' interest rate approach. In addition, what Leijonhufvud 
considers the loanable funds approach is simply the explicit inclusion 
of a loanable funds market in one's analysis. As I have tried to 
argue, this is really a meaningless exercise. 
B. Another Look at the Sequencing of Events 
Associated With These Two Interest 
Rate Approaches 
In Chapter IV I suggested that one way of differentiating between 
the liquidity-preference and loanable funds views was in the implied 
sequence of events generated by these two approaches following some 
shock to the economy. In addition, in Chapter III I attempted to 
broaden Patinkin's criticism of the liquidity-preference approach by 
demonstrating how it always ignores the impact of Imbalances in the 
loanable funds market on the time path of the interest rate. The 
question I want to ask now is whether the same sort of criticism 
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might also be leveled against the loanable funds school? I think 
the answer to this question is yes. From a loanable funds view, 
imbalances in the product market have no effect on real output 
until they manifest themselves in the money market. This strikes 
me as unappealing as the thought of ignoring the effect of imbalances 
in the loanable funds market on the rate of interest. What then is 
the solution to this issue? 
At least at the introspective level (which might be completely 
wrong), what appeals to me are models that make real output a function 
of excess demand in the product market, and the interest rate a 
function of excess demand in the loanable funds market. This would 
imply a rejection of both the liquidity-preference and loanable funds 
theories, at least in a dynamic setting. 
C. The Effect of Savings on Real Output and the 
Choice Between the Liquidity-Preference and 
Loanable Funds Views 
In this case I would have to opt for the loanable funds paradigm. 
Not that I necessarily believe that an increase in the level of savings 
will prove expansionary in the face of unemployment, but I have a lot 
less belief in the proposition that savings is always destructive 
in the presence of unemployment. It seems to me that the loanable 
funds school takes a more sensible intermediate position in this 
matter. 
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D. Some Conclusions 
We began by reviewing Leijonhufvud's rejection of the liquidity-
preference theory of interest. Leij onhufvud considers these two 
approaches to be radically different. He opts for the loanable 
funds approach because it represents to him a meaningful alternative 
to Monetarist theory. Unfortunately, Leijonhufvud's attacks on the 
liquidity-preference theory of interest is somewhat marred by his 
immature view of Keynes' belief concerning the determination of the 
interest rate. As we saw earlier, Keynes had reached the point in 
his own thinking where he advocated the introduction of a loanable 
funds component in his own money demand function. This is a far cry 
from the "special theory" form of the liquidity-preference theory of 
interest that Leijonhufvud tries to hang around Keynes' neck. 
We then noted how the loanable funds sequence, like the liquidity-
preference sequence, embodies a somewhat implausible assumption 
concerning the inability of imbalances in the product market to 
directly impact on real output. This led me to reject both the 
liquidity-preference and loanable funds approaches. Instead I chose 
a hybrid model composed of the product and loanable funds markets as 
being most plausible. 
And finally, I suggested that specifying the idle balance 
component of the money demand function from a loanable funds 
perspective at least provides for the opportunity of an increase in 
the level of savings proving to be expansionary. This would seem 
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to be a more reasonable position than one that closes the door 
permanently on savings ever playing a constructive role in terms of 
expanding real output in the short run. 
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VI. SOME FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
In the first chapter of this dissertation I wondered "why" and 
"whether" the observed habit by many economists to exclude the 
loanable funds market from their writings really made any sense 
from either a historical, logical or pedagogical view. We can now 
see that this question was a bit misphrased. More correctly, I 
should have wondered "why" and "whether" the observed habit by many 
economists to exclude the loanable funds approach from their writings 
really made any sense from either a historical, logical, or pedagogical 
view. 
As stated earlier, almost all of Keynes' diatribes against 
classical reasoning as it related to the determination of the interest 
rate may be rejected. To the extent that the classical and loanable 
funds approaches to the determination of the interest rate overlap, 
one may also reject these arguments as they might apply to loanable 
funds theory. But more importantly, what I attempted to bring out in 
my review of the liquidity-preference loanable funds interest rate 
controversy was how Keynes himself was beginning to gravitate towards 
the loanable funds position. Thus from a historical perspective, 
there really is no reason to reject loanable funds reasoning, at 
least within the confines of the liquidity-preference loanable funds 
debates. 
On issues of logic, at least from a dynamic perspective, I 
rejected both the liquidity-preference and loanable funds approaches. 
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Neither view makes much sense to me. The liquidity approach fails 
because it ignores the effects of imbalances in the loanable funds 
market on the time path of the interest rate, while the loanable 
funds view is unsatisfactory because it ignores the effects of 
imbalances in the product market on the time path of real output. 
For me, the most sensible position is one that makes the time 
difference of real output solely a positive function of excess 
demand in the product market, and the time difference of the interest 
rate solely a positive function of excess bond supply in the loanable 
funds market. In a static setting, I believe one has to choose the 
loanable funds alternative, which at least allows for the possibility 
of savings playing a constructive role in society even in the short 
run. 
This then leaves us with the issue of pedagogy. From all that 
has been argued so far, I would recommend the construction of models 
that utilize both the product market and the loanable funds market. 
Note that from a formal point of view, one could just as easily have 
said the product market and the money market. But given that the 
underlying dynamics of the stories we are going to tell makes the 
time path of the interest rate a function of loanable funds 
imbalances, it seems to me to make more sense to include this 
market over the money market. 
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